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1 Introduction 
1.1 General Introduction 
Bolivia1, like many of Latin American countries, is abandoning Eurocentric ideals of 
capitalism and development, and replacing them with strong state-led economics and a 
set of values that hold social justice, community and being one with the nature as 
priorities. The notion of Vivir Bien, living well, calls for an end of endless and 
unsustainable development, and instead of a better life it petitions for a good life. It has 
an inherent role in the Bolivian constitution, and has for a large part taken the place of 
development as a concept for nation building in Bolivia.  
However, Bolivia is among the poorest countries in Latin America, and living well, 
even if not better, requires resources. Subsequently, the government of Bolivia is 
strongly engaged in constructing state-led extractive economy, and natural resource 
extractions that help to build social welfare are a source of contradiction. In order to 
pursue Vivir Bien, Bolivia engages in extractive actions that seem to go against the 
ideologies of Vivir Bien. 
One of the natural resources Bolivia is placing their economic aspirations for the future 
on is lithium. According to estimates, up to half of the known lithium reserves in the 
world reside in Bolivia2, at the salt brines of Salar de Uyuni3, where there is an on-going 
pilot project on lithium production with plans of industrialisation on the way. As lithium 
industries, for example batteries in electronics and electric cars, are growing, these 
resources could prove to be very lucrative to Bolivia and help them further alleviate 
poverty and promote welfare. Developing lithium production is not, however, 
unproblematic in the context of Bolivia. This study unveils some of the difficulties in 
lithium production in Salar de Uyuni, which reflect various issues and contradictions 
that often arise from extractivism, and lead to dissonance in relation to Vivir Bien. 
                                                
1 Map of Bolivia in appendix 1. 
2 Programa de Gobierno MAS-IPSP 2010-2015: 85. 
3 Map of Salar de Uyuni and surrounding areas in appendix 2 and pictures of the Salar de Uyuni in 
appendix 3. 
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1.1.1 Vivir Bien and the Bolivian Context  
Vivir Bien is a current and popular theme in Latin American politics. In Bolivia, while 
it had been long developed by indigenous activists, scholars, and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), it first emerged as a concept in the context of state policy 
making after president Evo Morales was elected into office in 2006. His political party 
Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) gained rapid support with a melange of indigenous 
motives and growing opposition towards Western values, and his victory marked the 
first time indigenous activists and peasant union leaders have gained political power in 
Bolivia. Since this historical shift in the political sphere, Vivir Bien was presented in the 
National Development Plan of 2006 (Plan Nacional de Desarrollo: Bolivia digna, 
soberana, productiva, y democrática para Vivir Bien, PND) as the central concept 
directing new state development policies, and later in the 2009 constitution in the moral 
and ethical values of the State.4 
In the new constitution economic activities are seen from a culturally plural point of 
view, and their objective is to secure Vivir Bien.5 This can be seen as major statement of 
intent towards a more humane and environmentally sustainable way of arranging 
society.6 The constitution also addresses the rights of indigenous people and local 
communities,7 and the governmental slogan of Bolivia is ‘No se puede vivir bien si los 
demás viven mal o si se daña la naturaleza’ (‘You cannot live well if others are living 
poorly, or if you damage the nature’). 
1.1.2 Lithium – a Material of the Future 
Lithium is a chemical element, the lightest of metals and highly reactive and flammable. 
It has multiple applications in different industries, such as ceramics and glass, 
(rechargeable) batteries, aluminium, air treatment, rubber and pharmaceuticals. What 
makes it an especially interesting and current resource is its ability to store vast amounts 
of energy in very light weight. As oil reserves are depleting and polluting internal 
combustion vehicles are starting to get replaced with hybrid or even fully electric 
vehicles, and climate change demands a comprehensive switch to renewable energy 
                                                
4 Ranta 2016: 428; Gudynas 2011a: 443. 
5 Gudynas 2011a: 443. 
6 Villalba 2013; Walsh 2010. 
7 Lalander 2014: 14-15. 
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sources, lithium could offer a solution to the dilemma of optimised storage of energy. 
Solar power and wind power both are energy sources dependent on the ability to store 
the energy gathered during windy and sunny days to be used when needed. Likewise the 
biggest challenge in electric vehicles is to pack the automobile with batteries that last 
long but do not weigh too much or require disproportionate amounts of space.8 
Lithium is not a scarce material per se, but it is usually found only in small 
concentrations and its extraction can be a difficult task. The main deposits in which it 
can be found are salt lakes, pegmatite stone and the sea. The largest reserves are located 
in the ABC/lithium triangle of Argentina, Bolivia and Chile.9 Assessments of the 
world’s lithium reserves vary a lot, and Bolivia’s own estimation of the quantity of 
lithium in Salar de Uyuni is more than 100 million tons, equalling about 49 percent of 
world reserves10, although other, more cautious calculations approximate Bolivia’s 
reserves at 27 percent of the world’s in-situ resources.11 Extraction from salt lakes is the 
most cost-efficient and environmentally friendly of the options, although it is also a 
slow process. In general, starting production takes two to three years due to the 
necessary processes of sampling and pilot production. Lithium in salt lakes is found in 
the salt brine beneath the surface, from where it is pumped to large evaporation ponds, 
where sun and wind induce the concentration of different elements, and the last point of 
the production is refining lithium in an industrial plant.12 This process can take several 
years depending on the climate and weather conditions.13 The process requires a lot of 
water, a resource that is very scarce in the dry desert and semi-desert areas where the 
salt lakes are situated.14 
Lithium production has been in rapid growth since the turn of the millennium especially 
due to the increasing markets of lithium-ion batteries and the fact that EVs are 
becoming more common. Lithium prices are in constant rise, and while demand right 
now is on the rise, there are still relatively few producers of the material. In other words, 
there seems to be a market for the thus far undeveloped reserves of Bolivia. At the same 
time the price is not likely to grow so high that it would no longer be attainable for the 
                                                
8 Fletcher 2011; Grosjean et al, 2012. 
9 Kesler et al. 2012. 
10 Programa de Gobierno MAS-IPSP 2010-2015: 85. 
11 Gruber et al. 2011. 
12 A diagram of the traditional extraction process in appendix 4, picture of evaporation pools in Salar de 
Uyuni in appendix 5. 
13 Espí Rodriguez and Sanz Contreras 2013; Fletcher 2011; Grosjean et al. 2012. 
14 Espí Rodriguez and Sanz Contreras 2013: 10. 
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EV markets, and a report by Grosjean et al. finds that the world’s lithium resources 
should “guarantee resources for – ten times the current world number of automobiles”15. 
1.1.3 Research Questions and Objective 
The main research questions of this study are: What is the relationship between lithium 
production and Vivir Bien? How does lithium production in Bolivia fit to or contradict 
with the ideals of Vivir Bien? How is dissonance between seemingly conflicting ideals 
and practices mitigated? 
The sheer size of Bolivian lithium reserves makes this an exceptionally interesting case, 
especially as this resource is yet to be exploited on an industrial scale. The current 
Bolivian government led by Morales and the MAS has nationalised some natural 
resources and envisions to profit from lithium without succumbing to conditions 
dictated by foreign companies. Existing research on lithium extraction in Bolivia 
portrays an arena mixed with hopes and uncertainties, and this research complements to 
those sentiments. Lithium is a fairly new commodity, especially in its modern 
applications that have only recently extended the scope of its economic importance. 
Therefore, there remain many uncertainties surrounding the implications of lithium 
extraction and production, and this research examines them especially in relation to 
(neo-)extractivism and Vivir Bien.  
Theoretically this thesis is positioned within post-development, the branch of theory that 
challenges the notion of ‘development’ and its hegemony as an object of human life and 
endeavours. Furthermore, the theoretical-conceptual framework is provided by political 
economy and especially the discussions of extractivism and neo-extractivism. This is 
further extended with analytical tools of political ecology: the case of lithium 
production through which I examine the relations between extractions and an alternative 
to development is a concrete operation with environmental and ecological consequences 
and prerequisites, and therefore I argue that an approach combining political economy 
with political ecology opens new angles to the theoretical discussion of extraction. Like 
Bebbington and Bury have displayed, the issues within extraction are more divergent 
than traditional framing through political economy and resource governance imply.16 
                                                
15 Grosjean et al. 2011: 1741. 
16 Bebbington and Bury 2013. 
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The primary objective of this thesis is in presenting, analyzing and offering possible 
explanations to contradictions and dissonances within the relations between extractions 
and Vivir Bien as seen in the lithium production project, and two key concepts I use in 
this analysis are neo-extractivism and resource nationalism. ‘Neo-extractivism’ differs 
from traditional extractivism in that the actor conducting extractions is the state, and 
these activities are justified by redistribution of revenues. ‘Resource nationalism’17, on 
the other hand, is a concept that I use to refer to the sense that natural resources are seen 
as a part of national patrimony, and tied closely with identity and sovereignty, a 
phenomenon existing not only in popular politics but prevailing in other arenas of the 
society as well18.  
As academic literature on Vivir Bien has shown, the notion, while offering an 
interesting ideological alternative to development in theory, has not as of yet translated 
to practice. This is also confirmed in my empirical findings, and illustrates a dissonance 
between stated priorities and actuality in current Bolivian politics. Furthermore, this 
thesis offers the finding that within these contradictory relations, resource nationalism, 
both as a notion explaining the strong ties between identities and natural resources and 
as a political rhetoric tool, has a meaningful role in mitigating the seemingly conflicting 
concepts of neo-extractivism and Vivir Bien. 
1.2 Methods and Material 
The principle methodology this research uses is semi-structured qualitative 
interviewing, which is complemented by critical analysis of policy documents and 
academic studies that connect with the topic. The main material consists of 13 
transcribed interviews with 10 different people that I conducted during fieldwork in 
Bolivia.19 All interviews were recorded and transcribed except for one, where my 
recording device fell during the interview and only written notes remain. The people I 
interviewed were researchers working in different universities and research institutions, 
current and former officials of the Bolivian state directory for extractions of evaporitics, 
(La Gerencia Nacional de Recursos Evaporíticos, GNRE), local politicians and people 
who were active in their communities in the Potosí department; both in the city of 
                                                
17 See, for example, Young 2017.  
18 Bebbington and Bury 2013. 
19 List of interviews in appendix 6. 
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Potosí and the municipalities of Uyuni and Colca K in the province of Nor Lipes, where 
Salar de Uyuni is located. In order to obtain deep and confidential insights from my 
informants, I opted for conversational technique in my qualitative interviews. As a 
result, the contents of my interviews were quite diverse, and this provided me with a 
very rich and multifaceted material. At the same time this meant that my material did 
not provide substantial evidence in such subjects that I discussed only with few or even 
just one of my interviewees, necessitating the use of other documentary material. 
Therefore, I complement my findings with a literary review on articles regarding the 
subject, and policy material such as the National Development plans of Bolivia. I have 
not aimed at achieving an exhaustive literary review in order to keep this thesis concise 
and on point, but have used articles that are most relevant to my case in order to either 
prove my findings or illuminate contradictions. 
I have made certain divisions of my interviewees in order to explain and highlight 
trends and viewpoints different people had. Age- and gender-wise my informants are a 
fairly homogenous group, a fact that limits the scope of my findings, but also enabled 
me to analyse the answers according to more specific groupings. The two clearest 
distinctive traits that seemed to correlate with certain kinds of answers were the level of 
education of the informant, and whether they lived in the Potosí department, where 
lithium reserves are located, i.e. had a strong personal interest in the lithium project, or 
in La Paz, the administrative capital of the country. Also people I met at GNRE had 
very distinctive views of certain things, but this I will refer to explicitly where 
necessary. The other two divisions, level of education and personal ties to Potosí, I will 
use as descriptors throughout my analysis in order to outline connections.  
While I refer to these groups they should never be read as an estimation of the 
significance or validity of what was said. In many instances I found myself aligning 
more with critical opinions both of the project and more widely of the government and 
their actions. This was partly because in my assessment, the informants did not have a 
reason to be against the project, other than the problems that were present in the project 
itself. Some of the people even clearly stated that they wanted lithium production to 
succeed, and that initially they had been very pro Morales, and many of them still were. 
These more critical views were usually also expressed by those informants whose 
background was in research and academics, and I have tried to be careful not to 
empathise too much with them, as they do represent my own group of reference and 
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hold a status that I respect. After acknowledging these possible motives that could affect 
my analysis, I have come to the conclusion that while the information I got from the 
informants with higher education seemed at certain points factually more accurate, on 
other levels, such as how things were experienced and how, for example, worries were 
expressed, all information that I was given provided me with interesting insights, and I 
have tried to treat all findings equally. 
1.2.1 Fieldwork 
My fieldwork took place from the end of November 2015 until the end of January 2016, 
and was comprised of the above described interviews and a visit to the project’s pilot 
production site. I was mainly based in La Paz, but travelled to Potosí department and 
visited the town of Uyuni and the city of Potosí as well. In Uyuni after visiting the pilot 
production area in Llipi Llipi I also made a stopover at Rio Grande, which is the closest 
habitation to the production site. My personal observations from different locations in 
Bolivia helped me both to contextualize the contents of the interviews and to 
complement the data I gained from them.  
The interviews were semi-structured, and I had a list of open-ended questions that I 
used as a basis in all of the interviews.20 In some I was able to ask more or less all of 
them, but in others where the interviewee was very talkative, I only introduced my 
subject and asked a few questions, and they would go on long tangents of everything 
they felt was related to the subject. Some of my interviews, especially towards the end 
of my time on the field when I got more confident, resembled more informal 
conversations than structured interviews, although this varied depending on the status of 
the interviewee. In all instances I kept my questions broad, as I wished to get answers 
based on what the informants viewed as the main issues and did not want to impose on 
them. Some clearly felt this was obscure and would had wanted to understand what my 
agenda was, so I tried to emphasise that I had none and was specifically interested in 
their views and opinions.21 
Being able to visit the pilot project was very beneficial and helped in understanding the 
scope of the enterprise and also gave insight to how the project is run. As a state-led 
operation it was strictly regulated who, when and with whom it was possible to visit the 
                                                
20 Interview guide and interview questions in appendix 7. 
21 Ranta discusses a similar approach to interviewing in Ranta 2014: 40-43. 
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area, and gaining access was bureaucratic and complicated. But once I had been cleared 
for visitation I was treated very respectfully and the manager of the plant himself took 
the time to give me a tour around the facilities.  
1.2.2 Main Concerns and Drawbacks 
One of the main issues I was worried about going into this research endeavour was 
whether my level of Spanish would be adequate for carrying out the interviews. This 
troubled me especially because these were also my first ever interviews. In the end and 
especially after the first few interviews, my language skills proved to be decent enough 
for the purpose. I had my questions very well formulated so I did not have to worry 
about my own vocabulary while asking questions, and I understood the answers well 
enough to stay on track even if I did not catch every single word. With more fluent 
Spanish I probably would had been able to be more reflexive in the interview situations 
and ask more accurate follow-up questions, but in a few instances I was also able to use 
my lacking skills as an excuse to get clearer answers and probe more without seeming 
too provoking.  
Language barrier was, however, an on-going issue throughout my fieldwork, also 
because to many of my informants and other people I met and relied on in practical 
concerns Spanish was not the first language either. The instance where I felt that this 
limit to communication was hindering me most was actually arranging the interviews 
and getting in touch with possible informants, not the interviews themselves. This also 
became the most difficult and frustrating part of my fieldwork, and the part that – 
combined with time constraints – limited the scope of my data collection most. I had the 
names of a few contacts already before going to Bolivia, and I used the method of 
snowball sampling, asking each of my informants for new contacts to get in touch with 
at the end of each interview. I tried to enlarge my network of contacts through every 
interview, but the further I got from my initial interviewees, the harder it was to get in 
contact with these people. To some extent this was a practical issue: it was challenging 
to reach people by phone, and almost no-one answered emails. Phone calls in a foreign 
language are also more demanding than conversing face-to-face, and I do not know how 
but at one point one potential informant thought that I was trying to buy cement from 
their company, diverted me and never answered my calls again.  
 12 
Through reflexivity of my difficulty of arranging encounters I came to realise that 
Bolivians rely considerably on social relations in all of their exchanges. My experience 
was that if I just marched into a building and was able to meet a potential informant in 
person, they were very amenable for an interview either straight away or later in the 
same day. But this was difficult to accomplish when I did not know where people lived 
or worked, who to ask directions from for certain offices, people travelled a lot, or I 
knew of an institution but not any specific people working there. Getting in touch with 
informants in these circumstances proved even more challenging with Christmas 
holidays cutting into my time on the field, and with people living and working in cities 
quite far away from each other. Travelling was time and money consuming, and 
therefore I would had needed to arrange interviews beforehand to ensure that I would be 
in the same city with someone at the same time, but making plans in advance like this 
was not something most of my contacts were used to doing, and their schedules were 
fluctuating. Many also lamented that the end and the beginning of the year was the 
busiest time for them, making it difficult to arrange time beforehand for an interview. 
1.2.3 Power Dynamics and Ethics in Interviews 
Going in to my fieldwork I was apprehensive of the fact that the people I was 
interviewing and who I wanted to get in touch with had higher statures in the society. 
Be it a leading economist in Bolivia or an activist in a local community, they were 
people in positions of power, and people with specific knowledge or expertise in this 
particular subject. The fact that my informants were far from powerless meant that I did 
not quite know what kinds of issues this dynamic might entail, other than that possible 
problems would probably not be the typical ones of development studies. Traditionally 
fieldwork in development studies involves a researcher from the North studying poor or 
marginalised groups in the South22, and the power imbalances associated in these 
interactions are well documented and there are many methods in mitigating them.23 
Power dynamics in researching the elite have not been studied as much24, but I was 
encouraged to embark on this field work by my supervisor, Eija Ranta, who has studied 
political elites at the state level in Bolivia.25 Therefore I knew that although challenging, 
                                                
22 Nader suggests that this is due to researchers studying what they like, and many prefer the underdog. 
Nader 1972: 19. 
23 Scheyvens and Leslie 2000; Scheyvens et al. 2003; Chambers 1997. 
24 Scheyvens et al. 2003.   
25 Ranta 2014. 
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this research endeavour was achievable. Some of the obstacles of ‘studying up’ have 
also been mapped out by Laura Nader: for example access to interviewing the elite 
might be difficult, which was certainly true in my study.26 The person that I made most 
attempts to arrange a meeting with was Luis Alberto Echazu, the head of GNRE, but all 
my efforts fell short. My actual study subject was not however the people who I 
interviewed, but the processes and structures related to relying on natural resource 
extractions (lithium) in welfare building. I was not interested in my interviewees 
themselves, as much as the processes they were involved in, and I believe that my 
subject matter being less personal helped dispel reservations in the interview situations. 
Another aspect that I was conscious of in many ways was gender. All of my 
interviewees were men, and I am very aware that this is far from ideal. I wished to find 
women to interview as well, but I was only given the names of two women who might 
had been good informants and was not able to get in contact with them. The difficulty of 
accessing women’s knowledge is a wider problem of development fieldwork, as 
appreciation of a female perspective is relatively new and men do not often see them as 
active participants in decision making even when they do have concrete roles.27 This 
was also accentuated with my deliberate decision to focus on the structural and concrete 
levels of the state lithium project, which was – as far as I could see – a completely 
masculine endeavour. I am not sure whether this reflected the views of my male 
informants, or whether there truly were no women involved in the stages of the project 
that I was mostly interested in, but the only women I met in the office of GNRE and the 
pilot plant were a receptionist, a nurse and what looked like assisting staff at the Llipi 
Loma pilot site. At the time of my fieldwork there were no women listed in the GNRE 
contacts on their website, either. Therefore, the fact that there is no female perspective 
represented in my material seems to reflect the reality within the state project at the 
time. Since then there has been at least one woman added to the list of essential contacts 
at GNRE. At community levels and within activist groups the gender distortion seems 
more of an imbalance in my material, and a female perspective would had undoubtedly 
brought more diversity to my understanding, as women often hold different kinds of 
                                                
26 Nader 1972. 
27 Momsen 2006. 
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knowledge than men.28 This will remain a drawback, and one that I believe I could had 
mitigated better with a little bit more time on the field. 
The gender imbalance also meant that in every instance I was a young woman 
interviewing much older men with high statuses. I was afraid that my youth and gender 
were going to affect how seriously I would be regarded. This was also something I was 
continuously conscious of in terms of safety and comfort – I was careful to arrange 
meetings in public or formal places and to dress in a neutral way. In the end it did not 
feel like these aspects of my person affected my interviews in a significant way. Some 
informants – especially those with academic background – spoke to me in a “teaching 
manner”, and in order to make them comfortable I encouraged this dynamic by asking 
more clarifying questions than I would had in another kind of situation. Interviewees 
with less or no academic training seemed to respond to me with a mixture of 
apprehension and respect, and mostly all of my interviews were carried through with 
surprising ease.  
The lithium endeavour in Bolivia is currently gathering some international scholar 
interest29, and many of my informants had been interviewed on the subject before, and 
by Western women too. This was told to me usually with some pride, and it seemed that 
academic interest in Bolivian issues was welcome to at least those people who I met. 
This might reflect the fact that people viewing Western researchers more critically 
might not be so willing to participate and would therefore not even be recommended as 
interviewees by other contacts, or it might just be that while foreign companies are 
regarded with some distrust in Bolivia, scholars are more welcome. 
Another potential problem I tried to be conscious of was that as this was a state-led 
project that I was studying, some people might not feel comfortable sharing critical 
views. I ensured that I was not affiliated with any governments or NGOs, not Bolivian 
nor foreign, and that all material would be treated with confidentiality and anonymity, a 
prevalent practice in doing qualitative research30, and an important aspect of conducting 
fieldwork with people in positions of power.31 In the end only one of my informants 
expressed their worries over this. Those who held the most critical views were already 
vocal in the public, and people further away from La Paz and the government did not 
                                                
28 Momsen 2006. 
29 See, for example, Revette 2016 and Hodson 2015.  
30 Mauthner et al. 2002. 
31 Scheyvens et al. 2003; Ranta 2014: 50-51. 
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seem too concerned when they had views that were conflicting with the State’s interests. 
People in or closest to the GNRE or the government were certainly more tight-lipped 
and on few occasions I was told in a very straight-forward manner that there could be no 
questions about politics. The only person within GNRE that could had answered these 
questions was Echazu, with whom I had an interview scheduled but which was 
cancelled and we were unable to arrange a new one. In text I have changed names of all 
informants except for two, who had published research relating to the subject and whose 
general views and opinions were widely known. The people referred to by name are 
addressed by their first and last names and others by first name pseudonyms. 
1.3 Disposition 
The structure of this thesis is as follows: First I will present my theoretical framework, 
which consists of three parts. I begin with post-development criticism, which offers the 
large theoretical backdrop for all other, more specific conceptualisations that I use. 
After this discussion I will concentrate on Latin American political transformations, 
which follow the framework of post-colonialism, post-neoliberalism and, according to 
some, post-modernisation. I will then look at Vivir Bien as a specific instance of an 
alternative to development, and criticism that its practical application in Bolivian 
politics has invoked. After this I will turn to the problems of resource extractivism in the 
Global South and especially Latin America, where neo-extractivism has become a 
central concept in describing current strong state policies regarding natural resources. 
Finally, I will look at political ecology in its application to the subsoil as a theoretical 
tool for analysing relations different actors have to natural resources. 
After this I will concentrate on the findings of my field study, which I will discuss in 
three parts as well. I start with a survey of the history of lithium: how the current project 
got started and has been executed thus far, offering explanations for different problems 
and phenomena that emerge within this review. I will also look at the potential 
environmental impacts of the project, and how they are related to politics. Second, I will 
look at different issues on structural levels that surround the project, such as the 
contested relations between a strong, centralised state that is running the project, and 
departments and communities demanding for more autonomy. I will also review the 
problems that arise when a very technical project is furthered in a country where 
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expertise in the area is lacking, and how these were experienced to be connected with 
politics. Finally, I will discuss the economics of lithium.  
Third, I shall analyse the larger ideological issues raised in my interviews and reflected 
in the earlier chapters. These were the criticism and worries of neo-extractivism and 
heightened importance that was placed on exportable resources, resource nationalism as 
both a social and cultural phenomenon and as a political rhetoric, and finally how Vivir 
Bien was related to all of this. In the final chapter I will offer some concluding remarks, 
first in the form of a summary of both my findings and the central arguments of the 
study, and then with a short review of further implications this research has to offer. 
2 Theoretical-Conceptual Framework 
The theoretical-conceptual framework of this thesis combines post-development 
theories with literature on the realities of extraction-led political economy. I will first 
discuss alternatives to development, and how these theoretical aspirations can be seen in 
practice in contemporary Latin America. I will then turn to the concrete alternative 
concept of Vivir Bien, which has been adopted in Bolivia in the state policies, garnering 
both heightened academic interest and critique of its shortcomings in practice. Finally, I 
will examine the current realities of resource extractions and economic dependency on 
natural resources, and I will complement this theoretical juncture with a look at political 
ecology of the subsoil in order to better conceptualise the multifaceted relations 
societies and states have with natural resources. 
2.1 Alternatives to Development 
2.1.1 Dismantling Development 
‘Development’ is generally accepted as a nearly universal object of human life and 
endeavours. Its hegemony is pervasive throughout the globe, and despite increasing 
criticism, the division to ‘developed’, ‘developing’ and ‘underdeveloped’ nations is 
often still taken as a granted. The roots of the developmental age are usually traced to 
President Harry Truman’s speech in 1949 after the Second World War32 and the 
                                                
32 This starting point of ‘development’ is also contested, as it can be argued that it disregards the meaning 
of the concept in earlier applications with Eastern European late industrialisations and Soviet 
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subsequent end of colonialism.33 The concept of development was first rather 
synonymous to economic growth34, in which social equality was thought to proceed 
from growth and redistribution of assets35. Later, when it became clear that economic 
growth would not magically bring prosperity to everyone, ‘development’ elaborated to 
entail social aspects of life, and in 1990 the Human Development Index was formed as a 
measuring method for development beyond economic growth.36  
The environmental harms of constant growth were first addressed in the 1970s. 
Economic growth and industrialisation in the North has always depended heavily on 
natural resources, the reserves of which are not infinite, and the 1972 report The Limits 
to Growth which was commissioned by the Club of Rome think tank from the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) was the first to question the idea of 
constant growth as a basis of development. The response to this was the launch of 
sustainable development in the early 1980s, where it was argued that economic growth 
could be attained in such a fashion that would not endanger the following generations’ 
ability to enjoy the same resources.37 Since the first introduction of the concept of 
development, it has gone through many transformations and now entails different forms 
or models of alternative developments, such as human development and sustainable 
development, along with other variations like the capacity approach and participatory 
methods that emphasise the role of the recipients of development aid and cooperation.38 
But with the accelerating rate of climate change and global inequality, it seems safe to 
say that the development apparatus, as the system created by the development discourse 
that exerts power over and produces knowledges of formerly colonised South has been 
identified by Arturo Escobar39, even after all reforms and adaptations is not working, 
and that alternatives not just within but to development itself are long overdue40. There 
is a robust intellectual critique, post-development, originating from the South, where the 
flip side of the developmental project has always brought about inequality and 
                                                
economic planning, and disrupts the continuity from practices already at place during colonialism. 
See, for example, Pieterse, 2000. 
33 Koponen et al. 2007; Escobar 1995. 
34 Gudynas 2013: 18. 
35 Berthoud 1998. 
36 Gudynas 2013. 
37 Gudynas 2013. 
38 Hettne 2009. 
39 Escobar 1995: 9. 
40 Gudynas 2016. 
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environmental ills41, and I will be examining this discussion especially through its 
vibrancy in Latin America.  
As claimed by post-development, development is a construction of the Western world, 
tightly linked with modernisation, the monoculture of globalism, capitalism and the 
illusion of constant growth42, and because the adjustments in the nature of development 
have always happened within that paradigm, the alternative development models have 
not and never will be able to make a difference. According to this thinking, alternative 
developments only mask the true problems, and actually by making development look 
better on the outside while remaining the same within, they can be even more harmful 
than development in its earlier, cruder forms.43 Jan Nederveen Pieterse compiles 
popular aspects of critique towards development comprehensively: 
Development theory and practice are rejected because it is the ‘new religion of 
the West’ (Rist, 1990), because it is the imposition of science as power (Nandy, 
1988), giving rise to ‘laboratory states’ (Vishvanathan, 1988), because it does 
not work (Kothari, 1988), because it means cultural westernization and 
homogenization (Constantino, 1985), because it brings environmental 
destruction -- development has been and still is the Westernisation of the world 
(Latouche, 1993).44 
First essential works in post-development were written in the 1990s by scholars such as 
Escobar and Gustavo Esteva, who argued for the need of an alternative to development, 
not just within it by positioning the story of development in the context of post-colonial 
theories. In his book Encountering Development: the Making and Unmaking of the 
Third World Escobar uses Foucault’s discourse analysis and builds on quintessential 
post-colonial works such as Edward Said’s Orientalism45, and asserts that not only is 
the ‘third world’ conceptualised from a Western viewpoint and rendered dependent on 
the industrialised countries, but development in and of itself is actually the cause of 
underdevelopment – the problem that the development apparatus aims at solving.46 In 
The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge and Power, another fundamental 
work of criticism on development edited by Wolfgang Sachs, the relationship between 
                                                
41 Ranta 2016: 426. 
42 Sachs 1998. 
43 Nandy 1989: 270; Serge Latouche 1993: 160-161; Esteva 1985: 78, all cited in Pieterse 1998. 
44 Pieterse 1998: 360. 
45 Said 1978, examines the power of representations, and demonstrates how cultural representations of 
Middle East and Asia have been constructed on false romanticised notions and prejudices. 
46 Escobar 1995. 
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development and underdevelopment is coupled even tighter, and in the book for 
example Gustavo Esteva argues, echoing the views of many Latin American 
dependency scholars, that underdevelopment is actually a prerequisite for development, 
not just a result of it.47 
The main argument of these post-development thinkers is that development is an 
extension of colonialism, and externally brought development based on Western views 
can never truly help its recipients. Even when a development project is successful, it 
contributes to the inherent inequalities and dependencies that underlie the global 
structures48. As well as illustrating the historically build nature of development, these 
seminal works of post-development emphasise that the concept of development shapes 
cultural and social identities and space. Discourse and knowledge produced within the 
development apparatus frame reality and affect people’s actions. The concepts 
‘development’ and ‘underdeveloped’ change the way that people who are labelled thus 
see themselves. This construction of underdeveloped subjectivity leads to a skewed 
power balance and secures the status quo.49 Thus Escobar calls for the end of 
development, neoliberalism and Western hegemony. He also argues that development is 
not something that can be exported, but is tied to place and culture, and suggests that 
instead of the Western development apparatus, society building should be endogenous, 
and that there needs to be a move beyond one-form-fits-all-blueprints for 
development.50  
2.1.2 Latin American Transformations: Towards Post-Neoliberalism and Post-
Modernisation 
The will to break apart from Western ideals can be seen in practice in Latin American 
countries and the transformations many of them have gone through in the past ten to 
fifteen years. As Escobar has analysed, these ongoing transitions can be seen as two-
fold: post-neoliberalist and post-modernising, as the turn that is happening is fuelled by 
a will to break from Western imposed socio-economic ideas (neoliberalism) and 
Western cultural hegemony (modernisation), both of which I will examine in this 
                                                
47 Esteva 1998. 
48 Escobar 1995. 
49 Escobar 1995; Sachs 1998. 
50 Escobar 1995: 212-226; 2010a. 
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chapter.51 It should be noted, however, that the whole idea of a state is originated in the 
‘West’, and making divisions of the globally interlinked socio-economic and cultural 
processes of the contemporary world is complicated. Here the terms ‘West’ and 
‘Western’ are intended to refer to the industrialised countries of Western Europe and 
North America, and should be understood especially in relation to the power imbalances 
of the world. 
Not long ago it was common that Latin American countries except for Cuba operated 
corresponding to a neoliberal idea of a state. According to David Harvey, the function 
of the neoliberal state is to ensure freely operating markets and free trade, which will 
then regulate themselves. The state should intervene as little as possible, and all barriers 
to the free, global mobility of capital should be erased, thus submitting state sovereignty 
to the global markets. Neoliberalism assumes that automatic mechanisms such as the 
‘trickledown effect’ will take care of social justice, and according to the theory, 
privatisation is the best way to conserve assets from the ‘tragedy of commons’, while 
individuals are held accountable for their own welfare.52  
Neoliberal projects were adopted particularly forcefully in Latin America, and the 
effects of these practices were diverse. In parts of Latin America neoliberal practices 
increased unemployment and rates of poverty, as well as produced exceptionally high 
levels of inequality especially in the 1980s.53 In the 1990s growth rate of inequality 
slowed slightly and many non-monetary development indicators continued to improve, 
although the time period of 1980-2000 is sometimes called the ‘lost decades’. During 
this time inequality continued to be high especially in relation to ethnicity.54 According 
to some evidence, neoliberalism reduced corruption and controlled inflation, but despite 
these advantages the social debt generated by cutting social spending dramatically had a 
huge negative impact on many Latin American countries.55  
In the past ten or so years there has been a notable backlash especially in the Andean 
region against the hegemonic global processes of neoliberalism, capitalism and Euro-
centric modernisation.56 Dissatisfaction in the ineffectiveness of neoliberalist social 
                                                
51 Escobar 2010a. 
52 Harvey 2005. 
53 Grugel and Riggirozzi 2012. 
54 De Ferranti et al. 2003. 
55 Grugel and Riggirozzi 2012. 
56 Escobar 2010a. 
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equity coincided and was coupled with growing openness of the political party field57, 
and this gave way to new visions of Latin American states that, at least in theory, have 
an alternative take on development and modernisation.58  
The trend in Latin America, and especially the Andean countries of Bolivia, Ecuador 
and Venezuela, is that the role of the state is reinforced, especially in redistribution of 
assets, with the understanding that markets are not, in fact, self-regulating.59 A capitalist 
system by nature creates inequality, which can be seen in both global and local trends of 
income distribution: there is an increasing gap between the poorest and the richest of the 
world60. In this context the role of state is also seen as a moral one, and social spending 
and eradicating inequality are high priorities. A post-neoliberal state as seen in Latin 
America takes a larger responsibility of the economic activities of the country, and aims 
at the welfare of the citizens. It views that it is the state’s responsibility to ensure its 
citizens rights.61  
Thus an important ideological departure from neoliberalism is in the way that the state 
relates to its citizens, and especially the poor. The state functions on more levels than 
just the economic one, and a neoliberal framework affected not only the flow of wealth, 
but culture and political practices as well. Holding economic liberalisation as the 
number one goal of the state encourages a certain kind of political atmosphere, where 
decision making becomes more technocratic, centralised and thus more difficult to 
access by the people. According to Grugel and Riggirozzi, during the neoliberal era of 
Latin America democratisation was viewed as consumption and being able to make 
choices rather than agency. The post-neoliberal leftist state projects have promised a 
greater inclusion of people in decision making and a wider cultural recognition.62  
At this conjuncture it is also relevant to examine the conflicts that have arisen between 
the new, strong state and decentralisations. In Bolivia a decentralisation reform was 
implemented from 1994 onward by the Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario 
(MNR), which Kohl argues to have been a response to International Financial 
Institutions’ (IFI) demands for decreasing government spending and also resulted in 
social stability that better enabled transnational companies’ access to Bolivian 
                                                
57 Van Cott 2005. 
58 Grugel and Riggirozzi 2012. 
59 Escobar 2010a. 
60 Ortiz and Cummins 2011. 
61 Grugel and Riggirozzi 2012: 3-6. 
62 Grugel and Riggirozzi 2012: 6. 
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resources.63 However, decentralisation led to the strengthening of indigenous and 
peasant unions and organisations, paving way for the victory of Morales and the MAS. 
The power balances have thereafter shifted again towards the centre during the recent 
transformations, which in Bolivia can be seen especially in the strong role the state has 
taken in governing and redistributing revenues accrued from natural resources. 
Dickovick and Eaton suggest that this should not be conceptualised as recentralisation, 
as the processes do not aim at reversing decentralisation processes, but is one form of 
many different strategies that central governments in Latin America have resorted to in 
order to mitigate their previously diminished roles.64 This has led to conflicts especially 
within natural resource extractions, and I will continue on the characteristics of Latin 
American transformed political economies in the context of resource extractions in 
chapter 2.3. 
These contradictions are linked to the fact that in reality economic actions of these states 
are not, to a large extent, dissimilar to those of neoliberal states. Andean countries such 
as Bolivia and Ecuador, have not actually nationalised their natural resources 
completely, regardless of what political rhetoric might suggest. In fact, Bolivia, for 
example, has merely re-negotiated their contracts with private corporations involved in 
different resource extractions in the country, displaying a sort of economic 
pragmatism.65 The MAS has dubbed their form of political economy in Bolivia as 
‘Andean-Amazonian capitalism’ and in the Bolivian vice-president and sociologist 
Alvaro García Linera’s description the MAS’s post-neoliberalism becomes “a form of 
capitalism which we believe contains a set of forces and social structures which, in time, 
could become postcapitalist”66. According to Escobar, these views remain within 
established Eurocentric imaginaries of modernisation and developmentalism,67 and 
Jeffrey Webber challenges the whole notion of post-neoliberalism, characterising the 
development model designed by the Bolivian State as ‘reconstituted neoliberalism’. He 
                                                
63 Kohl 2002. Academic discussion on decentralisation is, however, a lively subject. Hadenius (2003) 
concludes that decentralisation can strengthen democracy, but also breed corruption and 
mismanagement. Faguet (2006: 125-132) on the other hand suggests that in Bolivia this was a tactic 
the government used both to recapture voters’ loyalties during a rise of ethnic-based politics, and to 
deepen structural reform by making the state more efficient. 
64 Dickovick and Eaton 2013. 
65 Grugel and Riggirozzi 2012: 9. 
66 Linera 2007:154, quoted in Escobar 2010a. 
67 Escobar 2010a. 
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argues that these state policies are neo-structuralist68 rather than post-neoliberalist.69 So 
it would seem that what these contested but at least chronologically post-neoliberal 
transformations actually mean and entail on the state level is still under process, and 
whether they offer a meaningful departure from neoliberalism remains to be seen.70  
On the other hand, the cultural transformation, or departure from modernisation, is 
perhaps more ideological than concrete, but is –together with post-neoliberalism– linked 
tightly with the post-development debate. In his article My Paradigm or Yours from 
1998 Jan Pieterse attests that the core question of post-development is actually 
modernity.71 Modernity, an elusive but persistent term, refers to the knowledges and 
processes originating from European ideas of progress and rationality that produce a 
dichotomous ontology and precede practices such as colonialism, industrialisation, 
democratisation, nation-state formation and globalisation.72 Latin American states are 
not necessarily venturing for radical changes like for example denouncing 
modernisation with all its connections per se, but are looking for different forms of 
modernisation. This is connected to indigenous and multicultural ontologies, which are 
gaining space and long over-due recognition in state policies, while indisputably 
differing from Western views.73 
Typically, modernisation and globalisation are thought of in European terms, but for 
example the Latin American modernity/coloniality –research program researchers 
propose an alternative narration of modernity as a network of local and global histories 
from different perspectives. This research program shows that a classical, Europe-
derived sense of modernisation continues the hegemony of Euro-centric worldview, and 
wants to appropriate modernity as they envision a broader sense of what ‘modern’ and 
‘global’ mean beyond the categories of Western epistemology.74  
There are more critical views also about the role of modernisation. According to Mario 
Blaser, critical theory needs to move beyond one single world history and the all-
                                                
68 “While granting that the market will remain the central organizing force in society, neostructuralists 
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69 Webber 2011. 
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72 Haferkamp and Smelser 1992. 
73 Escobar 2010a. 
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encompassing conception of modernity. He structures this as a ‘politico-conceptual’ 
question, where radical alterities cannot be taken seriously as long as they are viewed 
through the lenses of modernity. One of the solutions he proposes is “-- shrinking 
modernity to make it something more specific and contrastable, thus liberating the 
conceptual-ontological space for something else to exist.75” He also argues that the fact 
that indigenous concepts are slowly infiltrating the political sphere in countries like 
Bolivia indicates a crisis of modernity, further proof of which are the irrefutable social 
and environmental consequences of modernity. On the other hand though, like Anders 
Burman notes in his comment on Blaser’s article:  
-- modernity selectively assimilates and disarms elements of alterity while 
simultaneously striving to produce ontological absence where ontological 
difference is detected, that is, denying the reality of any other reality than the 
one stipulated by modernity.76 
I share his scepticism toward the claims of a crisis of modernity as a dominant ontology.  
But it cannot be disputed that alternative ontologies are gaining more visibility.  
Forty years ago, opposing mining, oil extraction, or the increase of agricultural 
lands for environmental reasons or because indigenous ways of life would be 
profoundly disrupted would have been seen as sheer irrationality by most 
citizens in a Latin American country; not so now. The promise of modernization 
no longer appears as persuasive (which does not mean totally unpersuasive 
either).77 
The emergence of indigenous cosmologies and concepts such as Vivir Bien, to which I 
turn to in the next chapter, in the politics of Bolivia and Ecuador have been 
enthusiastically welcomed and researched in the academic post-constructivist discourse, 
and have inspired this work as well. But this does not necessarily equate to a crisis 
within modernity, and in practice the language and the knowledges of modernity seem 
to be thriving as vibrant as ever.  
In the context of this study, modernity becomes an especially poignant term in its 
relation to technology. Brey has argued that technology is both a creation of and shapes 
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modernity78, but is this relationship infrangible? Does post-development require post-
modernisation? Is modernisation an integral part of development, or could these 
concepts be uncoupled from each other? Lithium industrialisation as a Bolivian state 
project presents a uniquely interesting case to study through this theoretical framework, 
as it is at the junction of cutting edge technology, post-neoliberal strong state and an 
alternative to development, Vivir Bien. 
2.2 Vivir Bien 
There are various different approaches to alternatives to development arising from the 
global South, such as those constructed on Gandhian ideas of economics and 
development in India79, Bhutan’s vision of development as ‘Gross National Happiness’ 
based on Buddhist ideals80, the notion of ‘Ubuntu’ and its potential in post-Apartheid 
South-African nation building81, critical feminism and ecofeminism as conceptualised 
by Mies and Shiva82, deep ecology as it is outlined by Næss, and certain strands of the 
de-growth movement.83 It is interesting that there appears to be simultaneous trends 
towards integrating endogenous and traditional concepts to nation building in many 
parts of the global South, but I will be concentrating on Vivir Bien, an alternative to 
development derived from ontologies of Andean indigenous peoples. 
2.2.1 Vivir Bien as an Alternative to Development 
Academic interest and discussion around Vivir Bien has been wide and lively in the past 
ten or so years since it was first introduced in the policymaking in Andean countries, 
especially Bolivia and Ecuador. It originates from indigenous communities’ alternative 
forms of knowledge, and the core idea behind Vivir Bien, living well, is a democratic, 
communal way of living well instead of living better, in which profit and progress are 
not the measuring sticks for a good life and nature is seen as part of the community, not 
as an external commodity to be utilised. It endeavours to alter focus from the economic 
to the humane and the nature. The multiple terms for Vivir Bien (Buen Vivir, Sumak 
                                                
78 Brey 2003. See also Edwards 2003 on the relationship between modern societies and technologies. 
79 Dash 2012: 291-307. 
80 Priesner 1996. 
81 Eliastam 2015. 
82 1993. 
83 Gudynas 2013: 33. 
 26 
Kawsay, Suma Qamaña etc.84) represent the plural and multicultural nature of the 
concept or concepts, and one essential aspect of it is the equal and non-hierarchic value 
of different cultures and histories that Vivir Bien stems from.85 It is a concept with no 
single definition, but can be seen as a platform for differing views on development; a 
place of discussion.86  
The indigenous traditions as a starting point for Vivir Bien are important, and the 
relevance of this is emphasised by the fact that in these indigenous languages there are 
no translations for development or progress. This underlines its stand as an alternative 
to, not just within the development paradigm. Abandoning the notion of development is 
easily justifiable if the concept has never existed in that language and cultural context in 
the first place.87 These roots give also symbolic meaning to Vivir Bien as a break from 
Western oppression, especially as it rises from the cultures of those Andean indigenous 
people whom the practices applied by the Western development apparatus have 
marginalised and/ or subordinated.88 Often the indigenous populations are viewed as 
poor subjects of development aid, and policies that arise from indigenous cultures 
promote their agency and involvement.89  
Vivir Bien is also under a lot of critical examination, and it has been accused of being 
backwards and unpractical. But for example according to Gudynas the point of Vivir 
Bien is not extricating from all or any technological innovations of the modern age. The 
key of Vivir Bien is how the commodities of modern life are used, how economic 
actions are carried out and how the revenues are divided.90 Although rejection of 
Western values, modernisation included, is at the root of Vivir Bien, Bolivia is not 
trying to extract themselves from modernity per se; the process could be perhaps better 
described as re-appropriation to their own particular context. 
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2.2.2 Shortcomings of Vivir Bien in Practice 
The origin and core values of Vivir Bien differ from Western ideas of development, and 
this is also visible in the constitution of Bolivia. The implementation and practicalities 
of Vivir Bien are, however, a popular source for critique.91 Although the constitution 
gives rights to nature and aims at securing indigenous peoples’ rights, the fact that the 
State has the last say is also made extremely clear. The constitution gives the Bolivian 
State the ultimate power over nature, and a right to commercialise its resources, and has 
a right to resources even where the land has been promised to local indigenous 
communities. Selling resources and industrialising their development is of top priority,92 
and specifically a task of the central government. 
While the new constitution gives the State a strong leash on their natural resources, this 
has not diminished their commodification as the principles of Vivir Bien would 
suggest.93 On the contrary, research has shown that extractions have increased during 
the Morales government.94 Bolivia has re-negotiated contracts related to the extractions 
of resources with higher revenues to the state, and ventured on strongly state-led 
economics, allocating their increased income to projects that aim at social and economic 
equality.95 This is called neo-extractivism, meaning that Bolivia is highly dependent on 
their natural resources, and builds their economy on state-led extractions, which in turn 
is justified with social programs.96 This also underlines the stronger role of the State and 
the importance of natural resources in constructing it: redistribution of assets is 
centralised and therefore an effective method for reasserting the significance of the 
State. 
Bolivia has been successful in reducing extreme poverty, distributing wealth more 
equally, and also expenditure on education and health have increased.97 The problem is 
that these improvements in social and economic equality depend on revenues from 
natural resources, putting environmental sustainability and local communities at risk. 
This is what Unai Villalba calls the Latin American Paradox: in order to reach Vivir 
                                                
91 Walsh 2010. 
92 Lalander 2014: 15-16. 
93 Arsel 2012: 150. 
94 Lalander 2014: 22. 
95 Rosales 2013: 1449-1452. 
96 Lalander 2014: 3. 
97 Lalander 2014: 23.  
 28 
Bien the State must compromise the ideologies of Vivir Bien.98 This also suggests that 
the constitution of Bolivia contains inherent contradictions. Promoting the rights 
included in Vivir Bien with profits gained from extractions is at conflict with the rights 
of indigenous communities and the nature. 
As Ranta has shown, these contradictions also demonstrate the fact that although on 
paper Bolivia is united behind the concept of Vivir Bien, different actors and 
policymakers who have been involved for example in conjuring the Bolivian 
constitution of 2009, have varying backgrounds and very divergent views of the State 
and economic affairs, and not everyone thinks of Vivir Bien as the starting point it is 
often presented as. The constitution was also a compromise of opposing political 
parties, the MAS and the right-wing Poder Democrático Social (PODEMOS), 
producing a mixture of ideologies and concepts.99 
Ranta further illustrates that there has also been a shift in political vocabulary and the 
comprehensiveness of Vivir Bien in policies. The first PDN of the Morales government 
and the constitution of 2009 applied indigenous concepts and were at least to some level 
based on the concept of Vivir Bien, but in the governmental plan of 2010 the 
terminology has been switched to that of modernisation and industrialisation, it is main 
focus being ‘Gran Salto Industrial’, the ‘Great Industrial Leap’.100 This is exemplified in 
the so-called TIPNIS-conflict, where the Morales government planned on building a 
highway through the Isiboro Securé National Park and Indigenous Territory (Territorio 
Indıgena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Securé, TIPNIS), a protected natural park and 
indigenous territory. The proposal garnered intense opposition from various residents of 
the area, and it accentuates the government’s renewed interest in large-scale projects 
despite their contradictions to the ideals of Vivir Bien.101  
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2.3 Resource Extraction in the Global South in the Age of 
Globalisation 
2.3.1 From Extractivism to Neo-Extractivism 
Extractivism refers to economic activities that are based on revenues from natural 
resources. Key issues in this context can be divided in two parts: how something is 
extracted (including who does it, where, what is extracted and at what environmental 
and social costs) and how the proceeds are distributed. Relying on natural resources as 
the basis of economic growth and through that, welfare and development, is fairly 
synonymous to export-led growth. This usually means that the economy is dependent on 
foreign direct investments (FDI) and global prices of the commodities exported. 
According to critics like Harvard economist Dani Rodrik, export-led growth rarely 
creates sustainable growth or positive externalities such as larger industrialisation, 
expertise, jobs or education.102 Generally extractions are rather technology and capital 
intensive, and do not employ large numbers of unskilled labour despite of ideologies.103 
In addition to not creating positive externalities, dependency on natural resources often 
leads to various economical risks. The Dutch disease is a condition where wealth from 
one resource increases the value of the currency, rendering other exports less 
competitive. This is tightly linked with boom-bust cycles, where varying rates of 
extractions and world prices mean that an economy dependent on only one or few 
export resources is not stable. The booms in Bolivia have included mining different 
metals (the plunge in tin prices in 1985 brought the whole mining sector down and 
consequently led to hyperinflation), natural gas in Chaco region and more recently 
private mining and agricultural products.104 Emphasising exportable goods usually also 
means that other forms of creating value are neglected.105 Abundant natural resources 
can even according to some economists be the reason behind poverty, but although there 
is often correlation between rich natural resources and poor states, the causality is not as 
simple as that.106 What is clear though, is that the ailments of export-led economics can 
be beneficial for industrialised countries. The mechanism of ‘inmiserising growth’ 
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describes the chain of events where a high world price of a certain good will inevitably 
lead to overproduction, which in turn leads to reduction of value. Lower prices of raw 
materials are advantageous to industrialised countries who are usually the buyers of 
primary commodities and value-adders in global production chains.107 
Many of Latin American states’ progressive governments, Bolivia among them, have 
reacted to these detriments of traditional extractivism by taking a stronger role in the 
extractivist activities. This is called neo-extractivism, and researchers such as 
Gudynas108 and Acosta109 address the fact that “this nationalist stance110” is aimed rather 
at giving the states a stronger role in the extractive industries, than at restraining ill 
impacts extractivism causes socially and environmentally. Bolivia has responded to the 
problem of distribution of benefits by generating social programs with revenues gained 
from extractions, and social and environmental ailments are treated as a necessary evil 
for a larger good. With this logic extractivism is “seen as indispensable for combating 
poverty and promoting development.111” This is visible in the NDP, where the role of 
the State is accentuated in eradicating inequality and poverty, which is to be attained by 
nationalising and industrialising natural resources.112 
And the tactics of the government seem to have succeeded. The poverty headcount ratio 
in Bolivia has gone down from just over 59 percent in 2004 to under 39 percent in 2014, 
and in the same period the Gini Index declined from 0,60 to 0,47113. But Webber 
challenges the impact of social spending in this equation in his book From Rebellion to 
Reform, noting that social spending remained very moderate during the first Morales 
administration, and he attributes poverty reduction for the most part to the growth in 
revenues resource exports have brought the state. 114 It should be taken into 
consideration, however, that cash transfer programs have probably had an effect on the 
overall social expenditure after the first term of Morales. In any case, there is support for 
nationalised extractions, and poverty-reducing activities have made the government 
popular; no other president in the history of Bolivia has been elected for two 
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consecutive terms, and Morales got re-elected for a third term in 2014 with a landslide 
victory. For Bolivians the tables have turned in the sense that they are the ones 
benefitting from practices that have previously added to the wealth of others.115 It is 
obvious that poor countries wish to eradicate poverty even if it has a cost on the 
environment. While as an ideology, Vivir Bien endeavours to alter focus from economic 
and anthropocentric activities to a bio-cosmic worldview,116 in the practical application 
people come first.117 
This human-first approach brings forward another problematic aspect of growth and 
development that relies on natural resources. The problems of humanely justified 
extractive politics are related to the juxtaposing of different groups within the country, 
and state-led resource extraction projects have negative impacts especially at the point 
of origin of the natural resources. This means that although painted as a practice meant 
to generate wealth and equity for all, these policies actually induce inequality, as the 
adverse effects are felt more strongly in certain areas and in certain groups.118 There is a 
risk of marginalising local groups that suffer most of the extractive industries, and 
tensions between rural and urban areas and their contradicting interests should not be 
brushed off.119 There is a dilemma between indigenous communities’ territorial 
sovereignty and state led projects, the revenues of which could be used for the benefit of 
the very same communities in question.120 The issues at the heart of the strife are 
fundamental. Whose rights are more important and who gets to determine what kind of 
development should be advanced?  
Still, it needs to be stated that not all of the current environmentally detrimental projects 
on-going in Bolivia can be ascribed to the Morales government. In fact, many of them 
have been issued by previous, neoliberal governments and are under protection of older 
contracts.121 Also, global demand for Latin American exports was rising when Evo 
Morales was first elected, which had a strong positive effect on social expenditure in 
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Bolivia.122 Jean Grugel and Pía Riggirozzi suggest that post-neoliberal governance 
would not had been possible at all without the favourable global economic climate.123   
There is a long history of colonial extractivism in Bolivia and the underlying economic 
structures attributing to the ways in which the current government is devising their 
economic activities are harder to transform than the constitution.  This can especially be 
seen when Morales defends his government’s actions by referring to pragmatism: what 
will Bolivians live off of if not their natural resources?124 Bolivia’s economy has been 
largely built on natural resources, as this has benefitted the agendas of global powers 
already from the start of colonial times. As post-development theory construes it: 
structures that made the underdeveloped world are also hindering its endogenous escape 
from it. Even while declaring an ideological departure from Western socio-economics 
and culture, the South continues to be a part of the globalised world, and their options 
for developing their economies can be quite limited.125  
In this light, it is not a surprise that through neo-extractivism the governments of South 
American countries take on the role of the accumulator and the capitalist, which in 
Western context is usually reserved to transnational companies. Their actions are not 
dissimilar to those of transnationals, where accumulation of resources is the guiding 
principle of all activities, despite harms to the environment and local communities. As 
Gudynas describes, neo-extractivism has been weaved in a South American adaptation 
of developmentalism, where a contemporary hybrid of culture (modernity) and politics 
maintain the fable of growth and progress.126 Alberto Acosta crystallises the 
dependency at heart:  
-- the evolution of these primary export economies is characterised by the fact 
that their production is subordinated to and motivated by external demand, [and] 
demand from industrialised countries still dictates the framework of extractive 
economic activities.127 
So, although Vivir Bien can be seen as an ideological step away from the North that 
indicates, like Ranta attests, Bolivia having “more sovereignty to decide over its own 
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development paradigms128”, the dilemmas of extractivism are global ones. So long as 
there is growing demand on natural resources, there will be extractivism. Therefore a 
rethinking of economy in the North is mandatory for the South to move away from 
production of mere primary materials.129 
Again, this is an intersection in which lithium presents an interesting case. Often the 
departure from constant growth and unsustainable development is imagined either 
through technological innovations or through structural change. Lithium could be a 
material of the future, and combined with the right structures of production and 
development, it could provide Bolivia an opportunity to escape the ills of extractivism 
and neo-extractivism. But at the same time it is a mineral that needs to be extracted, 
linking it with the problems of extractivism and neo-extractivism described above. And 
by no means can one substance free a country from the unequal global economic 
structures. 
2.3.2 Political Ecology of the Subsoil 
Although my primary interest is in the relationship between Vivir Bien and 
extractivism, lithium production, the case through which I examine this conjuncture, is a 
concrete operation with environmental and ecological consequences and prerequisites. 
The political economy of extractivism is tightly linked to the politics of lithium 
production, or the political ecology of the operation, and although the method of lithium 
extraction through evaporation differs essentially from other, more disruptive methods 
of extracting subsoil materials (mining, drilling etc.), it is still a non-renewable resource 
coupled to the same economic, geographical and political ecological issues as other 
subsoil materials. I therefore supplement this theoretical framework with literature on 
the political ecology of the subsoil.  
Anthony Bebbington and Jeffrey Bury emphasize the importance of the subsoil, as 
fossil fuels, minerals and building materials all hold substantial significance in 
contemporary social life, but also argue that the subsoil has been disregarded in political 
ecology so far. These natural resources and their extraction have mostly been researched 
through political economy and resource governance, but the issues linked to extraction 
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are clearly much more divergent and should therefore be examined also through the 
framework of political ecology.130  
The environmental effects of subsoil extraction are vast and affect the poorest people 
most. Bebbington and Bury argue that environmental hazards are actually endogenous 
to the internal basis of capitalism, and due to the very large scale of these operations, the 
risks and calamities are often difficult to assess. As the political climate surrounding 
extractions is charged due to scale and value, independent knowledge can be very 
difficult to attain. The changes that extractions create at extraction sites are also 
extensive both in time and space, and often stay permanent and can affect future 
generations in ways yet unknown. These transformations require adaptation and it is 
therefore important to examine the political economies that drive them. As extractions 
of the subsoil mostly deal with non-renewables, the territories are usually attained by 
land enclosures, preventing all other usages of said land areas.131 This underlines the 
struggles at heart in “understanding processes of landscape transformation in areas 
affected by extraction.132” 
The geographical dimension of extraction indicates interaction with spatially defined 
identities, both national identities and territorial indigenous and regional identities 
regardless of national boundaries. Michael Watts and Richard Peet argue that societies 
carry ‘environmental imaginaries’, in which the nature has socially constructed aspects, 
but the society is as well constructed by the nature, and reflects history and social and 
individual practices of particular places.133 This means that nature and society are 
enmeshed in a complex and profound way, which paves way for the further argument of 
Watts that resource extractions134 generate radicalised identities especially in situations 
that are already politically unstable or volatile. This is linked closely to the notion of 
nationalism that often comes up in the crux of nature and extractions.135 The sense of 
national identity is invoked both by having to face nonlocal actors taking away goods 
and in a more profound way when “extracted product is associated with national 
identity, sovereignty and security” and “the subsoil is somehow more closely tied to 
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nation than is any manufactured product, or even perhaps labour value itself.136” This 
resource nationalism is not limited to popular politics, but exists and occurs in 
professional arenas in resource industries as well. It is therefore important to recognise 
the role that environment can play in societies beyond being something that is produced 
and governed.137 
3 Findings and Discussion 
As I began the analysis of my transcribed interviews it became quickly apparent that 
starting lithium production in a country like Bolivia is a theme that operates on different 
levels, which seemed often to be in contradiction with each other. The way that people 
spoke of the concrete operations of the state-led industrialisation project differed from 
how they discussed ideologies surrounding extraction and development, and one person 
could be at the same time overtly optimistic about the possibilities lithium could bring 
Bolivia and the department of Potosí, utterly critical of the management of the project 
and pessimistic of the probability of success.  
In order to outline the complex relations between extractivism and building Vivir Bien 
or welfare through the lithium operation, I have identified and divided my findings to 
three different levels, and the same partition functions as the structure of this chapter. 
First I will look at the state’s lithium project in its concrete form: how did the endeavour 
start, what is actually happening in the production area, how has the project been 
managed so far, and what kinds of conclusions or implications can be drawn from these 
questions. The second level on which the conversations with my informants traversed 
were the structural restrictions that constrict the ways in which a complex project such 
as this one can be realised in a country such as Bolivia. The final third level on which 
my interviewees talked about the lithium production project was the political and 
ideological level. What could and should happen, what kinds of decisions have and 
should be made and what do they tell about the contemporary politics of Bolivia? 
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3.1 The State-led Lithium Project 
All of my interviewees talked about the concrete different stages of the lithium project. 
Predictably those who were or had at one point been involved in the project itself put 
more emphasis in retelling the history, and explaining current developments and both 
technical and managerial issues in the project. A lot of complaints were made about the 
slow progress of the project, and the management was criticised heavily. In the next 
three chapters I will give a brief description of the background of the project, how the 
project has been executed so far, and the impacts lithium production could have on the 
environment in Salar de Uyuni. 
3.1.1 History of Lithium in Bolivia 
Lithium production and development are not a new subject in the area of Salar de 
Uyuni, located in the department of Potosí, province of Nor Lipes within the 
municipalities of Uyuni and Colcha K, which is one of the poorest regions in Bolivia. 
Lithium was first discovered in 1969, when French institute Office de la recherche 
scientifique et technique outre-mer (ORSTOM) (Now Institut du Recherche pour le 
Développement, l’IRD) came to the salt flat to conduct studies in co-operation with the 
University of San Andrés in La Paz (Universidad Mayor de San Andrés, UMSA). The 
aim was to determine structures of the Salar as well as to find out which individual 
components the salt liquid is comprised of.  
After ORSTOM and UMSA published the first find of lithium deposits in the end of the 
1970s, the Salar started to garner interest from foreign companies.138 “The whole world 
wanted to come here”, reminisced David, a retiree who had been involved in studies on 
lithium in Bolivia, as we met for tea at a crowded little café on a cold evening. As a 
response to the heightened interest, the Salar was declared a fiscal reserve of the 
Bolivian State by law 719 in 1985, and a committee, Complejo Industrial de los 
Recursos Evaporíticos del Salar de Uyuni (CIRESU), was founded to oversee 
international bidding contests for any foreign concessions.139  
Due to financial constraints, a typical drawback for countries in the global South, the 
Bolivian government was unable to exploit the Salar on their own. In the 1990s, Bolivia 
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gave concessions to US Lithium Corporation (Lithco, now FMC) in contradiction to the 
CIRESU law. When this deal became public, people in the department of Potosí and 
especially the leaders of Potosí Civic Committee (Comité Civico Potosinista, 
COMCIPO) opposed the terms of the contract vehemently, and organised strikes that 
paralyzed the department of Potosí, and the leaders of COMCIPO arranged a hunger 
strike in La Paz. The intensity of opposition to Lithco is not surprising in the context of 
the history of Potosí. Bolivia, like virtually all of Latin America, as has been traced by 
Eduardo Galeano140 in Open Veins of Latin America, was forced to serve as a resource 
base for other nations building their industries and development in the colonial era, and 
in the 16th and 17th centuries over half of Spanish silver and gold came from Bolivian 
mines located in Potosí.141 The Cerro Rico, ‘Rich Mountain’ looming over the city of 
Potosí remains a constant reminder to the people of the wrongs they have endured, 
which have made a permanent mark in peoples identities, even more so than in the 
identities of Bolivians in other parts of the country. 
The protests led to the annulation of the contract, an accomplishment of the COMCIPO 
that was recollected with pride by Walter, a veteran activist whom I interviewed at his 
auto shop. But soon there was a general election and a new, leftist government was 
formed by the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR). In Bolivian history this 
was the time of structural adjustments, a response devised by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to combat hyperinflation in Bolivia in 1985.142 As a 
consequence, all political parties implemented the same neoliberalist policies dictated 
by IMF and World Bank, and after a round of bidding (allegedly just for show) the 
contract with Lithco, now FMC, was renewed with small alterations compared to the 
first one, giving the state a slightly bigger role. The second contract was not received 
well in Potosí, either, but in the end it was FMC that decided to set their lithium 
operation in the Argentinian Salar de Hombre Muerto instead of Salar de Uyuni. Salar 
de Hombre Muerto does not contain as vast amounts of lithium as Salar de Uyuni, but it 
is more easily retrievable, and the political atmosphere for foreign companies was more 
favourable in Argentina than Bolivia.143  
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In one of my interviews with David, whom I met several times to discuss especially the 
history of lithium production, he lamented that contracts with Lithco were very poorly 
negotiated, and gave virtually all the rights to Lithco with little revenues to the Bolivian 
State. The tendency to comply with “bad contracts” was also mentioned by Marco 
Antonio, a university professor I interviewed at his office, as a recurring fault in 
Bolivian politics: “We do not know how to make and negotiate a good contract - - if we 
compare ourselves to Chile, or Argentina, when we started talking about lithium in 
Bolivia, they did not know anything either. Now they are ahead of us.” This problem 
was linked with blatant corruption and clientelism. As per the ideals of neoliberalism, 
the role of the state was diminished, and so during the era of structural adjustments a 
large part of Bolivian economic activities were privatised.144 David recounted me the 
practice of diezmal, where parties involved in negotiations would customarily get a ten 
percent cut of the contract, and suspected this had been the case with Lithco as well. 
Corruption has often been a pervasive problem throughout the global South and has also 
been used as justification for privatisations and shrinking roles of ineffective states 
during neoliberalism, but according to Sanz Galindo, who has traced the role of 
corruption in Bolivia during the era of privatisations, corruption actually spiralled 
upwards during the neoliberal era as the role of the state subsequently diminished145. 
The relationship between neoliberalism and corruption remains contested and context-
dependent, and Grugel and Riggirozzi for example have suggested that neoliberalism 
could also have reduced corruption in some instances.146  
All in all, the early stages of lithium in Bolivia reflect the politics of the neoliberal era 
and function here as a background against which the current politics and the on-going 
lithium project can be examined. After the unsuccessful negotiations with Lithco/FMC 
there were other attempts at getting concessions for the lithium, but nothing concrete 
ever happened, and it seemed like the lithium was forgotten for a while during the 
height of privatisations in the late 1990s. The resource was revisited after its value and 
global markets started to increase after 2000147, turning it into a more profitable 
investment. 
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3.1.2 The State-led Lithium Project Today  
Lithium re-emerged in political discussions after Evo Morales’s election as the first 
indigenous president in 2006 marked a prominent change in Bolivian politics, and this 
time it was the federation of rural workers of South-Eastern Potosí, (Federación 
Regional Única de Trabajadores Campesinos del Sudoeste Potosino, FRUTCAS) that 
took initiative in proposing lithium industrialisation for the government, acting 
according to the advice of Belgian engineer Guillaume Roelants. Roelants had 
originally come to Bolivia with an NGO working with agriculture and had stayed in the 
Uyuni region selling salt and boric acid, and he was one of Evo Morales’s supporters 
when he first came to power, as well as an important community figure in Uyuni.  
There is a pronounced difference in attitudes towards lithium production in Uyuni in the 
past and now, acceptance seemingly being dependent on the proponents of the actions. 
While previous proposals met forceful opposition, under the Morales government 
production was received well in the department.148 Roleants’s personal involvement 
probably aided this transition, as he was both close to Morales and to FRUTCAS, and in 
this new, post-neoliberal Bolivia unions held and hold significant power.149 The change 
in attitudes towards lithium extraction by locals has also been noted by Revette150. 
According to her, this positive and welcoming stance looks to be unique to lithium, and 
similar switches have not taken place in other extractive sectors, such as traditional 
mining or hydrocarbons, where conflicts and protest over government actions have 
transpired during the Morales government as much as, or even more so than during the 
neoliberal era.151 
Initially the government met with experts and the heads of UMSA and the University of 
Tomás Frías of Potosí (Universidad Autónoma de Tomás Frías, UATF) to begin the 
development of Bolivian lithium production. UATF had been doing research on lithium 
in collaboration with the University of Freiburg in Germany, who had experience in 
lithium treatment. They began their own pilot research project on the subject, which 
produced a new method for lithium production with two new patents, which were to be 
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divided equally in three parts between the University of Freiburg, UATF and the 
Bolivian State.152  
Co-operation with the universities, however, never really started, and in 2010 lithium 
was declared a strategic resource, meaning that the state could be the only stakeholder 
in its production. The project would be carried out with Bolivian money153 and Bolivian 
professionals, and GNRE was founded under the Bolivian State’s mining company, 
Corporación Minera de Bolivia (COMIBOL)154 to develop and control the production, 
corresponding with other nationalisations the government had implemented. None of 
my informants who talked about this turn of events knew the exact reasons for not 
including the universities in the project. Some speculated that the government did not 
want any foreign involvement in the project. According to David, it was unacceptable to 
the government that a foreign institution (the University of Freiburg) would had held 
33,3 percent of the patents, and he continued saying that one should never mix politics 
with science and research, because it will only further politics, nothing more. Miguel, an 
economist who had been involved in the early stages of the project, argued that this was 
also due to the fact that the technology developed by UATF and the University of 
Freiburg would not had worked on an industrial level. Even if this was the case, 
terminating all involvement of Bolivian universities seemed very incongruous, as this 
would appear to be a prime opportunity for promoting Bolivian know-how, research and 
innovations. This inconsistency seemed to be a side effect of the reassertion of state 
power, and suggested of power struggles between the central government and other 
actors in Bolivia, which I will examine in more detail in chapter 3.2. 
Roelants became a key person in promoting and advancing the project, and was 
appointed head of the lithium pilot plant even though he had no background in 
chemistry or technology.155 He left the project in 2013 and since then the project has 
been led by engineer Luis Alberto Echazú, who was the mining minister of the first 
Morales government and former principal of Universidad Tecnica de Oruro. Both 
Roelants’s and Echazú’s appointments highlight the importance of personal ties in 
Bolivian politics and – as I had come to notice while arranging my interviews – in other 
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aspects of Bolivian life as well. Marco Antonio asserted that the leader of GNRE could 
never be someone who did not have personal connections to the government, and 
therefore people with technical expertise working at universities were overlooked when 
deciding on the replacer of Roelants.  
The importance of strong personal connections is linked to clientelism, a political 
strategy with long roots in Latin American history in which electoral support is 
exchanged for particular benefits.156 These client-patron-relationships, where elected 
politicians, or patrons, “are expected to redistribute their wealth, and the wealth of the 
state, through the provision of jobs to their clients”157 and votes can be bought with 
certain favours, have been an integral part of the Bolivian political system. When 
Morales first came to power it was supposed to be the end of the politics of patronage, 
especially because traditionally indigenous and poor groups were usually seen as 
clients; receivers and objects of political decision making, whose votes could be bought 
with specific promises. Vertical participation was to be replaced with horizontal, 
responsive politics with indigenous people in state offices, but translating indigenous 
forms and practices into the state apparatus that arguably is based on vertical power 
relations is complicated.158 At least in relation to GNRE it would seem that even if 
clientelism was not as prevailing as before, close relationships between elected 
politicians and the officials they appointed were consequential. This is especially 
noteworthy due to the criticism that GNRE and its management in particular were 
subjected to. 
The project now in place consists of three parts, as was described to me by José Luis, an 
engineer of GNRE who I met for a brief interview at the central office of GNRE in 
downtown La Paz. Phase one of the project, production at pilot level, was on-going 
during my fieldwork. Phase two, industrial scale was being planned in co-operation with 
a German company K-UTEC, who are designing the industrial lithium factory, and later 
a contract has been signed with a French company regarding the lithium production, and 
a Chinese company is designing a potassium chloride plant. Phase three of the project 
would be further development of lithium-based products in the future, such as batteries 
and even electric cars.  
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It remained unclear what the current amounts produced were, suggesting that production 
of the pilot phase still had not reached the planned levels.159 The very slow 
advancement of production and industrialisation was a source of much frustration 
among many of my interviewees, and some, like Ricardo Calla, a former minister of 
Indigenous Affairs and currently an independent researcher working with environmental 
politics and economics, expressed concern over whether anything was happening at all 
in the project right now or if it was paralysed with bad management and technical 
problems. The contents of these aforementioned contracts had not been made public, 
which increased the disconcertment Calla and other interviewees conveyed.  
Having abandoned the production methods UATF had been developing, GNRE 
advanced with the conventional method of evaporation pools, and technology that was 
already in use at the Chilean Salar de Atacama. The problem with this was and is that all 
salt flats are different and the composition of the minerals in them varies a lot. This 
means that techniques used in one place are not always applicable in another, 
necessitating new technical innovations.160  
Choosing the method of evaporation pools was criticised by people who had experience 
in lithium production and were familiar with the properties of Salar de Uyuni. One 
question that was addressed by Calla and Miguel regarded the weather. Salar de Uyuni 
is an arid desert with very little annual rainfall. The El Niño phenomenon has, however, 
a notable effect on rainfall in the altiplanos, high plateaus of the Andes, which means 
that during positive years of the phenomenon rainfall is going to be heavier than in the 
negative years.161 Therefore the pools have to be covered and production paused for 
longer periods.  
When I asked about this problem while visiting the production site, I was told that this 
particular corner of the Salar de Uyuni did not get as much rain and so this would not be 
an issue. This seemed to be in contradiction to what I had been told by the other 
researchers. On the other hand, the lack of water is also a problem, because it is required 
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in the treatment of lithium. The inconsistencies in information I was given did not 
induce trust towards the GNRE, and there remained uncertainties of technical aspects of 
the current production methods, which, like contents of contracts, had not been made 
available for popular examination.162 The possible effects the production could have on 
the environment are further examined in the next chapter. 
In a four of my interviews a lot of emphasis was put on the production of potassium 
chloride, a by-product in the production of lithium that is commonly used as a fertilizer, 
and is far simpler to extract, treat and sell than lithium. Although it is clear that the 
production of different materials in the Salar cannot be uncoupled from one another and 
therefore it is justified to examine all of them simultaneously, the fact that at some 
points the production of potassium chloride took centre stage of the interviews seemed 
to indicate that lithium production was in comparison perceived to be very complicated. 
Coupled with the sparse information on contracts and production methods, and the very 
slow progress, the project appeared disorganised and hard to apprehend as a whole. 
Marco Antonio, who had also been close to the project in its earlier phases, was 
disappointed that production appeared to concentrate on potassium chloride as a 
primary product, and lithium as a secondary, which was not the original plan. He also 
felt that this was one of the reasons why the project was advancing so slowly: it was 
deviating from the initial objective by a product that was easier to produce, but would 
not generate technological development or global strategical advances for Bolivia.  
On the other hand, potassium chloride and other minerals that the Salar de Uyuni holds 
were regarded as much more practical targets for production. Potassium chloride for 
example could be used in improving Bolivian agriculture, and it would be an easy and 
uncomplicated way of benefitting the nation. Fernando, an Aymara man who I met in 
Uyuni talked about lithium as something too technical for Bolivians: “I am not going to 
go to the Moon or Mars, so I am not interested in lithium”, echoing a certain kind of 
resigned pragmatism that can also be seen in the justification of neo-extractivism. These 
pessimistic sentiments of Fernando can be seen as an indication of the internalised 
‘under developed’ subjectivity that Escobar has identified in his post-development 
critique. In Fernando’s assessment, lithium was not applicable to what he viewed as the 
Bolivian realities. 
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To conclude, the attitude towards the idea of lithium production was mostly very 
positive in my interviews, just like could be concluded from the initial welcoming 
attitude of Potosí workers union FRUTCAS, and conforming to Revette’s findings on 
the subject163. However, opinions of GNRE were more negative, and the current project 
and especially its management were criticised in many ways. People who had initially 
been very hopeful and had advocated for the project, such as researcher Carlos Arze of 
Bolivian research centre Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo Laboral y Agrario 
(CEDLA) whom I met in La Paz, had become sceptic. The idea of a state-led project 
with Bolivian money and ownership was welcome to even those of my informants who 
had more neoliberalist ideals, but the painstakingly slow pace, lack of transparency and 
digression from lithium to potassium chloride garnered distrust and frustrations towards 
GNRE and the management, design and execution of the project. 
3.1.3 Environmental Impacts of Lithium Production in Salar de Uyuni 
In many instances when I asked about possible problems with the project, the 
environment was brought up, but at times, and particularly when I visited the production 
area, this felt somewhat rehearsed and like something I was expected to want to hear, 
even though I never framed my question directly in relation to the environment. It felt 
like I was presumed to be concerned about the environment, which I obviously am, but 
as my field of study is not chemistry, engineering or environmental biology, this was 
not something that I could investigate on a concrete level.  
After having brought up the subject of the environment, José Luis at the GNRE and 
Mario, seemingly repeating GNRE’s notices on the subject, convinced me that there 
could be no problems whatsoever, or if there had been any they had been taken care of, 
while Calla, Miguel and Marco Antonio talked about masses of toxic waste, polluted 
waters and unknown effects for the ecosystem. The long-term environmental effects of 
huge evaporation pools are still mostly unknown, and there is no large-scale research 
published on the subject. In the Chilean Salar de Atacama, situated less than 400 
kilometres south from Salar de Uyuni, lithium extraction from the brine has been in 
progress for already 30 years, and while geologically and in relation to climate it is not a 
duplicate of Salar de Uyuni, it offers a suitable point of comparison.  
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In Salar de Atacama the biggest conflict between mining companies and indigenous 
communities living in the area has concerned water. When the brine is sucked to the 
evaporation pools, the hole left will be filled from waters running from higher grounds, 
depleting wells.164 The scarce waters in Salar de Atacama have been heavily polluted 
and “chlorine is used to water down the potentially carcinogenic lithium and magnesium 
compounds that are commonly found in the water table around lithium deposits.165“ In 
other words, impacts on the environment have been notably detrimental. Arze also told 
me that in Uyuni, some local people believe that the huge pools have an effect on the 
natural cycles of the environment in the region, and would contribute to worsening 
floods, but no in-depth scientific studies have been conducted in this matter. In any 
case, rainfall and very limited water resources in the area remained unresolved and 
important questions, and according to Meridian Institute, an independent French energy 
think tank, extraction of lithium from salares will cause irreversible destruction of the 
environment.166 
Another worry that was brought up were potential environmental impacts of the method 
that GNRE planned on using in the treatment of lithium. A study called Un Presente Sin 
Futuro- El Proyecto de Industrialisación del Litio en Bolivia co-ordinated by the 
CEDLA found out, that the conventional method of using chlorides in treating the 
lithium would result in mountains waste.167 The research was initially commissioned by 
GNRE itself, but when it was published and the results were not favourable for them, 
they condemned the study. After some time though, GNRE announced that the planned 
method had been replaced. What the new method is, who created it and how it works, 
was not, however, made public knowledge. The reaction of GNRE to the adverse 
outcomes did not evoke confidence. According to Arze, the writers were dubbed 
imperial right-wingers by the GNRE in their response to the publication of the results, 
implying that GNRE was not ready to examine possible problems in the lithium project 
in earnest, and the undisclosed new production method was the most prominent 
example of secretiveness, and principle cause for environmental concerns. 
It seemed like every time I tried to get clarifications about whether the production 
would result in masses of waste, or the water could be polluted or used up, or how 
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different methods varied in their effects on the environment, I got contradicting 
answers. This inconsistency seemed to indicate that the environment or environmental 
effects were not regarded with the severity that they would merit, and were mainly 
treated as a necessary evil that should be addressed publicly. Environment did not 
appear to be a priority in the planning of lithium production, and in the mechanics of the 
project, the salar was treated as a reserve for natural resources, not as an entity with 
inherent value like Vivir Bien would suggest. This is in contradiction to what Frieberger 
has found, as he has suggested that because the environment of the Salar is so unique, it 
could drive the locals and engineers to manage the land in new, less invasive ways.168 
Although GNRE has since assured that their production methods will not be harmful to 
the environment, and mostly my informants agreed that if the chloride treatment method 
will not be applied production could be safe, there will still be effects to the landscape. 
This might affect tourism, which is the leading form of economic activity in the area. 
The significant feature of the salt flat is its perfect evenness, which makes the scenery 
extraordinary. The town of Uyuni is overflowing with backpackers going for three-day 
jeep-safaris on the salar and its surrounding natural wonders, and the small town centre 
is full of rows after rows of tourist agencies and pizzerias. The Salar de Uyuni is the 
world’s largest salt flat. It can be seen from space, and in the rainy season, about 
January through March, the surface of the flat turns into a giant, perfect reflecting 
mirror, making it a unique travel destination. The parts where lithium production is 
taking place will not, however, be even anymore, transforming the landscape in a very 
fundamental way. So far production is taking place in the south-west corner of the flat, 
which is a remote place and not open to tourists, and hopefully effects will remain 
localised.  
But like three of my interviewees stated, all extractivist activities affect their 
environment, and hoped impacts will not be too extensive and harmful in this case. The 
Chilean Atacama does not provide a promising example, as there the huge evaporation 
pools cut through the landscape endlessly and mountains of white waste disrupt the 
topography of the salt flat. Some years back a Chilean delegation travelled to Salar de 
Uyuni in order to share their concerns of the detrimental effects of lithium extraction, 
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and warned that “the unique landscape of the salt plateau will be destroyed within two 
decades.”169 
3.2 Structural Challenges for Developing Lithium in Bolivia 
The concrete structural constraints and the circumstances of Bolivian lithium production 
were talked about a lot as well, and these themes usually explained or gave context to 
the problems and contradictions that were met on the more practical level of the project. 
I have divided the main concerns that were brought up into three different categories: 
the issues arising from centralised decision making and worries over distribution, lack 
of education and technical know-how, and the global economic issues related to 
producing a fairly new material. 
3.2.1 Power Struggles Between Centralisation and Autonomies 
As I have already disclosed, the GNRE was criticised over their lack of transparency 
concerning production methods with possible ramifications for the environment and 
contracts with foreign companies. Another topic of contest that emerged strongly in my 
material was the centralised nature of decision making processes. This was discussed by 
especially those of my interviewees who were active in the affairs of Potosí department 
or the municipalities of Uyuni and Colcha K, but also by researchers with no local 
affiliations that I knew of. After the government deemed lithium a strategic resource, it 
cut off all and any opportunities of the people of Potosí to take part in the project. In the 
constitution of 2009 it is clearly stated that strategic natural resources can only be 
“explored, exploited, industrialised, transported and commercialised”170 by the state, a 
testament of Bolivian neo-extractivism. Thus people living right next to the production 
area have no say in what happens where they live, diminishing local governance in 
contradiction to the ideals of decentralisation and plurinationality, notions promoted 
even in the new name of the Plurinational State of Bolivia.  
And not only do Potosí residents have no voice in decision making, but the people I 
interviewed complained also that they were lacking information regarding the project. 
Ángel, a member of the COMCIPO told me that they were asking for updates in Oruro 
and La Paz, because notifications about the advancement of the project did not reach 
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Potosí. These forms of inequality are a repetition of similar power disparities in many of 
the mining projects of Morales’s administration, as has also been noted by Revette.171 
Ángel also told me that the COMCIPO has issued a document for modifying the law 
that currently denies them access to any decision making. 
Another aspect straining the relations between the central government and the 
department of Potosí was that division of revenues had not yet been determined. This 
meant that no-one apart from GNRE felt ownership of the project, and Miguel, whom I 
interviewed at a hotel bar in La Paz in two different instances, indicated that this was 
also a possible reason for the very slow pace of the project. Fernando, a valued 
community member who seemed to know everyone in his home town, suggested that 
revenues should be divided the same way as profits from hydrocarbons, where income 
is distributed to departments and municipalities both by derivation according to the level 
of production and through a general transfer system that distributes income evenly.172 
According to him the COMCIPO is demanding that 70 percent of the revenues stay in 
Potosí, because the Salar is situated in Potosí jurisdiction.  
Fernando was all in all critical of the way the government was distributing wealth, and 
felt that the government was not spending enough on social sectors. He claimed with 
conviction that the biggest items of expenditure of the State were the army and the 
police, and that the number of officials in the central government had multiplied rapidly 
during the Morales administration. His exaggerated claims of security expenses being as 
much as 40—50% of the State’s yearly budget173 appeared to reflect his concern that 
communities in the Potosí department were not taken into consideration in centralised 
decision making. There was a clear unanimity with the people I interviewed in the 
Potosí department that the resulting wealth of increased mining174 in their department 
had not translated into social spending in the area. For example, Ángel complained that 
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in the city of Potosí they were still waiting for a new improved hospital they had been 
promised years ago. 
These concerns and complaints highlight a difficult and on-going debate between the 
strong, neo-extractivist state and local autonomy. On the one hand, the aim and 
justification of neo-extractivism is that natural resources will benefit the nation as a 
whole, and in Bolivia distribution of revenues has led to positive outcomes, as I have 
discussed in chapter 2.3.1. But on the other hand Morales’s popularity has arisen from 
indigenous and community movements, for whom autonomy is important, and 
decentralised, localised decision making is also a key component of Vivir Bien. The 
role of Potosí department was mentioned often in many of my interviews, and 
sympathies seemed to align with the poor department also among people I spoke to in 
La Paz. Why should the people of Potosí endorse an endeavour that they do not know 
how they will benefit of, and that in the worst case will bring them harm in the form of 
environmental impacts and drawbacks for tourism?  
Marco Antonio criticised the central government by saying: “At the moment we cannot 
charge for our own home, it is like the landlord has a house but the result is that the 
tenant is the one telling what to do and how to do it.” The conflicts in administering and 
distributing resources have been noted also for example by Ranta, who in an article 
describes the views of a Vice-Minister in 2008:  
According to the Vice-Minister, indigenous peoples were demanding too much 
when opting for self-determination within their lands and territories. In his 
opinion, they did not understand the increasing importance of the nation-state in 
decision-making processes and in the control of natural resources and 
territories.175 
The mentality that Ranta presents, where centralised state-actors view indigenous 
populations as primarily recipients of the state’s social actions, not as actors of change, 
was also apparent in the conflicts my informants expressed, and could be extended from 
indigenous people to all rural dwellers of the peripheries. The centralised decision 
making processes were a clear source of dissatisfaction in Potosí and Uyuni. 
The strong, centralised line the government had adopted was described as choking, 
paternalist, and not motivating for furthering local development by Fernando and Ángel. 
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This looks to be an especially incongruous political choice in a country famous for its 
volatile politics and robust activism, characteristics of Bolivian political and social life 
that also helped pave way for Morales’s presidency. The so called gas and water wars of 
2001 and 2003 gave momentum to indigenous and labour movements,176 and Bolivians 
will protest and hold strikes when they feel injustice, as was seen also with the case of 
the Lithium Corporation.  
Democratisation, decentralisation and a wider opening of the political sphere in Latin 
America were important factors in enabling Morales’s win, but in the last 10 years, as I 
have discussed in chapter 2.1.2, it seems that the decentralisation progress has halted 
and the centre – politicians and bureaucrats – are searching for new approaches to 
reassert the importance of the state. Methods such as declaring natural resources as 
strategic fiscal reserves are very effective ways of reinstating the power of the state, 
especially in a country where economy relies heavily on primary material exports.177 
The emergence of potential conflicts were already visible in the lithium project as well, 
even though it was still in the pilot phase, indicating the volatility of extractivism and its 
connections to radicalisations, as Watts has argued.178 
Like GNRE, also the current government was criticised for its lack of transparency, and 
the competence of the Morales government was questioned by some of my interviewees 
due to the inexperience of its members. Fernando complained that the new constitution 
created by the first Morales government in 2008 was very poorly written, and in his 
mind this was directly connected with just Morales and MAS, although in actuality the 
constitution was constructed by a Constituent Assembly, legislated by the Congress and 
approved by a popular referendum.179 I would claim that this is an example of how 
power and government politics is very strongly personified in Morales, and this type of 
speech where everything was credited or blamed on the president was fairly common in 
my interviews. When discussing government and governance of Bolivia, many talked 
about Evo Morales only, not even as in the Morales government, but about him 
personally as the one making all the decisions, further underlining the re-invigorated 
clientelism and patronage of Bolivian politics. 
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Critiques voiced against the current government in my interviews ranged from 
corruption and lack of transparency to incompetence and egoism. Those of my 
informants who expressed these critical views also deemed the lithium production 
project a prime example of the worst kinds of methods of action of the government, and 
Ángel compared the secrecy surrounding the lithium project to the relative openness of 
other state companies, such as the state gas company Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales 
Bolivianos-Corporación (YPFB), who have information on their finances, contracts and 
current and past activities readily available for anyone on their website.180  
At a different, very concrete level of development the project was, however, also 
welcomed enthusiastically, and even actively invited. The small community of Rio 
Grande situated right next to the production area is a dry, poor and isolated place. The 
road leading there would not be described a road by Western standards and telephone 
and internet connections are unreliable at best, although nowadays they at least exist. To 
the people living there the pilot plant has brought employment in the form of 
chauffeuring, construction, cooking and cleaning. There is a small hostel in Rio Grande 
that is constantly full, and the people are hoping to get paved roads and better network 
connections. Their vision for the future is that a fully industrialised lithium plant as a 
neighbour could help the community grow and create better education and healthcare 
opportunities.  
For people in marginalised communities such as Rio Grande these improvements in 
their day-to-day life were, at least for the time being, enough to compensate for the lack 
of power in and information of decision making, although Revette and Humphreys-
Bebbington are cautious of the longer term power dynamics that such imbalanced 
situations entail and create.181 It is possible that if adverse effects witnessed in the 
Chilean Salar de Atacama recur in Salar de Uyuni and/or positive externalities do not 
actualise according to the hopes of the local people, conflicts following the patterns of 
other mining industries are repeated with lithium. 
3.2.2 Lack of Technical Proficiency and Education 
It became apparent in discussing the concrete development of the lithium project that in 
this area of specified expertise, Bolivia lacked a lot of concrete prerequisites for 
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devising such a complex enterprise. This was mentioned often. The situation was 
described by Miguel: “for what we have planned you would need at least 100 
specialised chemical engineers in Bolivia. Four years ago there were five.” The lack of 
know-how seemed also to be a key issue from which the potential threats to the 
environment emerged.  
Many of my interviewees held the opinion that the reasons for the lack of expertise and 
proficiency stemmed from poor education and ignorance. There was a certain frustration 
expressed by especially those who themselves had higher education, although it did not 
for the most part appear to be necessarily directed towards the current government or 
Morales per se, but at the slow pace of improvements. Marco Antonio did, however, 
criticise the government for discarding “technical and professional hierarchy”, meaning 
that formal education was no longer a prerequisite for leadership positions (as was seen 
in the case of Guillaume Roelants being named as the chief of GNRE), and in his view, 
scientific research and expertise of officials was given less importance than before. This 
corresponds with Ranta’s analysis of the new processes of government in Bolivia that 
challenge “the technical expert regimes and authority of public servants by condemning 
them as remnants of neoliberal colonialism”182. 
The issue of education was especially emphasised by the people I interviewed in the 
province of Nor Lipes, who perceived it also as a regional policy affair. Fernando and 
Mario, both active community members in the neighbouring municipalities of Uyuni 
and Colcha K, wished there were better educational opportunities where they lived, so 
that young people would not have to move away in order to get an education. This is at 
the same time a feature of a society where grown up children habitually live with their 
parents far into adulthood, making the decision of moving away for studies a significant 
life choice, and to the larger issue of providing services for people living in the 
peripheries. The latter is yet another facet of conflicts between a strong state and the 
autonomy of municipalities and communities, but refers also to the far larger processes 
of urbanisation of life everywhere in the world, indicating of the conflicts between 
modernity and indigenous and/or rural ways of life.  
In few of my interviews the current education system in Bolivia was also criticised for 
its allegedly introverted nature. This was especially linked to the level of English skills, 
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which was considered one of the main obstacles for high-quality research in the 
universities, as English has become a fairly universal academic language. Marco 
Antonio, who worked at one of the larger universities in Bolivia, was even of the 
opinion that English should be taught at the expense of Quechua, Aymara and other 
indigenous languages, as they do not help Bolivians become globally competitive. This 
view, although singular in its extremity in my material, illustrates nonetheless how 
Bolivia is still a country divided in different fractions even as it seems more unanimous 
than before now that indigenous people and other marginalised movements have 
achieved political positions.183 Marco Antonio also suggested that the government’s 
lack of interest for improving education and especially university education could be 
attributed to their wish for people to remain ignorant, so they will not start questioning 
current policies. These views expressed are not consistent with the government’s 
achievements in, for example, literacy programs, which have been one of the successes 
of Morales’s government, adult literacy rate being now at over 95 percent,184 but again 
unveil dissatisfaction rising from the slow pace of changes and inconsistencies of the 
government’s actions. 
Also the quality of education in Bolivia was criticised in all of the interviews where it 
was brought up, and Miguel expressed a view that the government should actually be 
more involved with the universities in forming their curriculums, especially in technical 
careers, where research should be coupled with the State’s plans for industrialising and 
technical development. So although Bolivia can be described as a strong state with a lot 
of involvement in many arenas, it could still be seen as weak in steering education and 
research. The UATF had previously had a subject specifically on evaporitics, and they 
still had a department on primary material processes, among which non-metals were 
taught. Cooperating with the university located in the same department as the lithium 
deposit would seem logical, but as this was not the case, it looked like centralised 
sovereignty in governing the project was in actuality more important to the state than 
furthering Bolivian technical expertise in the area. 
In light of the emphasis that my interviewees – people involved and interested in 
furthering lithium production in Bolivia – put on education, the incongruity of GNRE 
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severing ties to Bolivian universities was even more pronounced. The three-phase plan 
of entering the lithium market with ultimately end products such as lithium-ion batteries 
and even electric cars would seem to necessitate improving technical capabilities, which 
cannot happen without investments in education and collaboration with the universities 
– at least not as a Bolivian enterprise. Yet Bolivian economy should not continue to rely 
on primary resource exports, as is also underlined in the newest PND.  
This leads to the importance of outside help and cooperation with transnational 
companies, which contravenes with prior clashes with foreign private corporations and 
the strong sense of resource nationalism according to which Bolivian resources should 
benefit only Bolivians, not anyone else, a prevailing subject that I will focus more on in 
chapter 3.3.2. There lies a contradiction in the way that the State emphasises 
nationalisation and at the same time does not seem willing to cooperate with different 
Bolivian sectors, centralising decision making and technical planning, and viewing them 
as a purely governmental process, to which researchers, universities, local communities 
and activists seemed to have little access. 
3.2.3 Economics of Lithium 
Due to the restrictions described in the previous chapters, it will still take time before 
industrial scale lithium production can commence in Bolivia. One cycle of the 
evaporation pool method requires five years to complete. The plans for the lithium plant 
will not be ready until 2018, and the construction of the plant will take years more. But 
in regard to the economics of lithium, timing is essential. Carlos Arze and Miguel 
highlighted the importance of the economics of producing lithium, and had very clear 
views of different risks and factors that should be taken into consideration in the project, 
which they felt GNRE had not done to a sufficient extent thus far.  
Lithium is not a commodity with a set world price but the price must be negotiated 
between producer and buyer. This requires contracts to be at place already before 
industrial production, and links the project at once to the global arena. The going price 
for lithium is defined by its producers, of which there are already many on the market. 
Commencing lithium industrialisation is a costly operation, and therefore the scale of 
production is essential: production must be large enough and operated cost-effectively 
so other producers cannot force the price too low for Bolivia to compete with. This 
requires technical efficiency. On the other hand, if Bolivia enters the market with too 
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much produce at once, the price will plummet. There is a certain kind of vicious circle, 
where in order for lithium products to be worth producing there needs to exist an 
adequate amount of lithium on a fair price on the world market, but Bolivia cannot enter 
the market before there is sufficient demand.  
Waiting for too long could also mean that the whole lithium boom comes and goes 
before Bolivia even gets their production started. Miguel asserted that there is a strategic 
window in the market that Bolivia should aim to; when demand is starting to get higher, 
but Bolivian production is also at a profitable level. The risk is that battery- and other 
technology where the growing demand for lithium exists, advances to other materials, 
such as hydrogen. This risk could be considerable, especially taking into consideration 
the high costs of the project. Miguel gave the following comparison: “if there is no 
vision of demand and supply, this project could be an alternative technology like - - the 
cassettes, the DVDs, like past technology.” So far the GNRE did not seem to have taken 
this into deliberation.  
All in all, the volume of lithium that Bolivia would be able to produce becomes a 
critical factor. Estimates of the amount of lithium in Bolivia span from 8 to 100 million 
tonnes, which is an enormous variation.185 The newer estimates done by COMIBOL are 
at the high end of the range, and if these highest estimates were to be true, Bolivia 
would not have to worry about its competitors, and could dominate the market. It seems 
that the government is relying heavily on the sheer volume of lithium in Bolivia as a 
deciding factor, as the project is still at its pilot stage 10 years after its initialisation.  
No matter what the actual amount of lithium in the Salar de Uyuni is, Bolivia has a lot 
of potential in lithium. But world leader or not in the quantity of lithium, producing just 
a raw material will not create economic transformation in Bolivia. This is also 
understood in the GNRE, where the third phase of the lithium project is manufacturing 
products with added value. The long history of Bolivia as a producer of raw materials, 
nothing more, was a pervasive theme of many interviews. There was a lot of emphasis 
on the need to produce end products and to industrialise, because it has been clear that 
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producing primary materials has not brought lasting economic development for the 
country. 
The production of batteries in Bolivia was so far the most concrete example or option 
for a Bolivian end product, and was mentioned in several interviews. The difficulty of 
the battery industry is, however, that there are no standards in phones or electric cars, 
which means that whatever kinds of batteries Bolivia is going to produce, it needs to be 
done in cooperation with a manufacturer of whichever appliance that battery is going to 
power. Ángel painted a picture of a future where “if we work together with other 
countries, we can cooperate even in vehicles here in Bolivia, why not? The materials 
exist. There is steel, there is iron, there is silver, there is everything for producing, you 
only need to industrialise.” 
Another feature speaking for the necessity of further industrialisation is that without it, 
the employment effects of lithium production are very small. When I asked about the 
potential benefits of lithium production, those with less academic background talked 
about job opportunities, and it is true that for a small habitation like Rio Grande, or the 
other communities in the municipalities of Uyuni and Colcha K, even just a few 
positions in manual labour make a noticeable difference. But in terms of the larger 
scale, most of the jobs generated will be short-term in the building of the facilities, and 
once production commences, it will be highly automatic and there will be next to no 
effect on employment in Bolivia. Further development of lithium products could 
generate more steady employment opportunities. 
All of this relates lithium to the global markets, which arguably function according to 
the ideas of neoliberalism with little regard to post-development or post-neolibaralism 
narratives of the South. As a primary export lithium is dependent on its external demand 
from industrialised countries, which means, like Acosta has attributed, that Bolivian 
economy as well is dependent on the West.186 Also, as a substance with high-tech 
connotations, lithium is interlinked with technology and modernity, and although this 
study material is too narrow to make conclusions of possible departures from Euro-
centric modernity within Bolivian lithium endeavours, the impressions I was left with 
reflected traditional attitudes towards progress and modernisation.  
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3.3 Politics, Rhetoric and Ideologies 
The final, largest level underlying all other discussion surrounding lithium production 
was the ideological and political preconditions at place in Bolivia. This chapter presents 
both findings from the interviews as these issues were discussed, and draws linkages 
and conclusions from previous, more concrete themes. It is divided in three parts that 
analyse the three principal concepts of this study: extractivism, resource nationalism and 
Vivir Bien, and offers the central findings of the research. 
3.3.1 Extractivism and the Morales Government 
In terms of extractivism all informants agreed that the Morales government has been 
even more vigorous than previous, neoliberal governments, complying with the neo-
extractivist models that existing research shows many Latin American countries are 
following.187 Arze, Calla and Miguel felt that the extractivist actions of the Morales 
government have been in practice very similar to those of prior governments of the 
neoliberal era, and that corruption and centralised decision making persisted as 
substantial problems, complementing to critiques conveyed by Escobar and Webber.188 
Although studies have shown a marked poverty reduction189 in Bolivia as a result of 
different cash transfer programs190, and taxation on hydrocarbon exports has ensured 
that Bolivia is not as dependent on donor money as before, few of my informants 
expressed a worry that the only thing that has changed after Morales came to power is 
the political rhetoric.  
It might be that the extent of improvements had gone undetected by these critics of the 
government, but it is also true that extra funds for social programs were provided by the 
hydrocarbon price bonanza back when Morales first came to power in 2006, not by a 
pronounced shift in wealth distribution models.191 Calla, with whom I discussed the 
dissatisfaction that he and his colleagues shared over the government’s actions in this 
arena, explained that they had first been very happy of Morales’s election, but now, at 
the third term, they felt that execution of transformations had fallen short from the big 
ideals Morales and MAS had initially advocated. He was of the opinion that the people 
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who were now in power had gotten accustomed to their status and were not doing as 
radical changes for the people as had been promised. 
These views point towards a troubling challenging of the fulfilment of the main 
justification of neo-extractivism in comparison to extractivism: the emphasis on social 
spending. If the structures remain the same, and difference in the state’s expenditure 
relies solely on heightened levels of extractivism, does neo-extractivism truly offer any 
ideological departure from traditional extractivism? In this conjuncture it would seem 
neo-extractivism is rendered to mere political rhetoric; a tactic for legitimising 
intensified extractions while economic actions continue according to the neoliberal 
agenda.  
It is understandable for a country to monetise on their natural resources when their price 
is peaking, but if this is done on the expense of other economic activities, it is 
unsustainable. The prices for hydrocarbons have declined steeply after 2009, even so 
much that incentives that the government has previously put in place to increase 
hydrocarbon production during years of high prices are, according to calculations of 
Arze, at current prices effectively nullifying the nationalisation decree.192 But the 
previous favourable global price situation in hydrocarbons has strengthened a 
conviction that extractions are the pathway to affluence, a positive attitude towards 
extractivism that Bebbington argues is common in most parts of Latin America.193 
Although a source of much contradiction between different groups within Bolivia, there 
is a lot of support for extractivism, which I will further examine in the next chapter. To 
this those of my informants who had a background in economics stated that continuing 
as a provider of primary materials through extractivism without any added value, would 
mostly benefit foreign transnational big companies, pertaining to the mechanism of 
inmiserising growth. They advocated for a change of mentality in the Bolivian 
economic model, only through which could lithium truly benefit Bolivia.  
As Bolivian economy leans heavily on extractivism, and has done even increasingly so 
in the last ten years, Arze was concerned that attention to other economic arenas, such 
as agriculture and especially domestic food security had decreased during the Morales 
government, a worry that has also been raised in a CEDLA report on food 
                                                
192 Arze 2016. 
193 Bebbington 2009. 
 59 
sovereignty.194 Arze criticised that the only kind of agriculture the government seemed 
to envision for the future of Bolivia is agroindustry aimed for exports, such as soya, 
ethanol and sugar cane. These actions would concur with extractivism, as both are 
economic strategies of generating income through exports, and worries expressed were 
linked to the general critique on relying too much on hydrocarbons, especially now that 
the boom had busted.  
There were also claims raised that manufacturing was not promoted sufficiently, which 
seemed to be in contradiction to the government’s new development plan of “The Great 
Industrial Leap”. Arze was especially concerned of the fact that in the 2000s, the 
composition of Bolivian exports was roughly 50 percent primary materials and 50 
percent other industries and agricultural products, whereas today the share of primary 
materials is 80 percent and other exports make up only 20 percent.195 This formidable 
change is not explained only by the increase in volume of hydrocarbon exports; the 
volumes of other exports have declined at the same time. For example the value of 
textile and clothing exports has decreased from 56 million USD to 34 million USD 
between 2000 and 2015196, which indicates a significant drop in volume when inflation 
is taken into account. Bolivia has started importing certain foods such as corn and fruits 
from Peru that have previously been produced in Bolivia, and a large textile factory has 
been shut down.197  
I also asked what my interviewees thought could be an alternative economic action to 
bring Bolivia and Potosí prosperity if the lithium endeavour would not succeed in that, 
and the most common answers were quinoa, camelids and textile industry. Both quinoa 
and camelids are grown and herded in the same region where lithium production is 
located, and as these are also water-dependent activities in a semi-desert area, disputes 
over water resources could become an issue.198 
The critique conveyed by economists and other researchers I interviewed that the 
government was focusing too much on primary material exports and especially 
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hydrocarbons was also linked to a certain type of pessimism regarding the lithium 
industrialisation project. The problems within it described in the previous chapters gave 
an impression that this was not highest on the government’s list of priorities, and while 
it is mentioned in government development plans199 it is clear that hydrocarbons are 
given preference in economic planning. In the context of extractivism, lithium is 
simultaneously connected to the contradictions and conflicts of it, and on the other hand 
remains overlooked within the framework of political economy devoted to easy exports.  
3.3.2 Resource Nationalism 
“This is clearly the last opportunity for Bolivia to escape poverty”, stated Miguel when I 
met him for the first interview. The theme of resource nationalism was the most 
common one to emerge in interviews without any encouragement on my part. I had read 
about resource nationalism before starting my fieldwork, but did not expect it and just 
plain nationalism to be so concrete both in my interviews and also visible in the 
everyday life in Bolivia. The text Orgullosamente Boliviano, ‘Proudly Bolivian’ was 
printed in many Bolivian packaged goods, such as drinks and foodstuffs, and being 
Bolivian was emphasised in every turn possible. Nationalism and patriotism are of 
course very common global phenomena and wrappings advertising local origins are an 
everyday sight all over the world. In Bolivia this seemed in some ways even more 
pronounced, though, which can be traced back to long struggles to having indigenous 
and other marginalised identities accepted and acknowledged on the state level, and also 
to the fairly recent reclaim of control of state economic activities after years of IMF and 
World Bank dictated privatisations. 
In my interviews this could be seen in a few different ways. Lithium was talked about as 
a gift to Bolivians, and the importance of the revenues for Bolivians was emphasised in 
all interviews, even by those who expressed more scepticism over who the reserves 
would advantage in reality. All occasions where Bolivians had been the ones working or 
studying something were stressed to a great extent. For example, when I visited the 
production area I was shown the pilot plant for potassium chloride, and proudly told 
which parts of the machinery were built by Bolivians and of Bolivian steel, and that all 
personnel employed by the plant were Bolivian, even though the machinery was 
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standardised foreign technology and the plant itself was very small, with only a handful 
of people working there during my visit. In other words, it was not a revolutionary 
industrialisation effort generating significant employment, but every smallest Bolivian 
achievement was worth mentioning. 
When it came to the subject of cooperation with foreign companies, a necessity noted in 
previous chapters, almost all interviewees acknowledged this prerequisite, although 
with certain stipulations. Those of my interviewees who had an academic background 
had usually the most pragmatic stance, and the importance of cooperation was 
especially recognised in discussions of visions for operations in the third phase, the 
value adding operations of lithium. As I have displayed in my prior discussion, it was 
acknowledged that technical knowledge and expertise to carry out these enterprises was 
lacking, even if a will to be autonomous was reflected strongly in most interviews. 
The most enthusiastic proponent for foreign companies was Marco Antonio, who told 
me when I interviewed him at his spacious office: “to go forward from [the basic 
chemical lithium bicarbonate] there needs to be a society with foreign companies, 
obviously big transnationals, who have markets for vehicles etc., and this is still very far 
away.” He was the only one of my interviewees who deemed unequivocally that 
governments prior to Morales had been better than the current one, and he was very 
sceptic of Bolivian competence in producing lithium. He commented the nationalism 
surrounding all natural resources, lithium included, by lamenting that finding new 
deposits and starting new extraction projects has never been done in Bolivia by 
Bolivians, as all current extraction projects have been started, and the deposits found, by 
foreigners, first Spanish conquerors and later North American corporations.  
According to him this necessitated stronger links with transnational companies, and the 
unfavourable climate that the government actions had created for foreign investments in 
Bolivia was a completely wrong tactic. Bolivia will not be producing batteries and other 
products for mere domestic consumption, and the strict conditions Bolivia is stipulating 
for foreign companies is creating wariness in potential associates; Bolivia is not 
considered a secure country to invest in.200 He believed this to be a mistake, and 
suggested that large companies should be given guarantees and protection in order to 
attract better investments and collaborations. In his opinion a country that is poor like 
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Bolivia cannot block foreign investors, because they do not have the money to invest 
themselves. 
While Marco Antonio’s view in this regard was the strongest, other people I interviewed 
also mitigated between ideological resource nationalism and pragmatism. No country in 
the current age of globalisation is truly self-sufficient, but many interviewees still 
emphasised the importance of ownership. This was in repetition of how the government 
and the GNRE have talked of the project especially in its early phases to the media, 
accentuating Bolivian money and Bolivian expertise.201  
Fernando explained that the relationship with foreign companies had to be reversed of 
what it had been in the past. Before, corporations had been the dueños, (master, owner, 
host), and now either Bolivians should be the dueños whose interests would be served, 
or Bolivians and foreign companies needed to become socios, equal partners. But in 
order to be equal with their business partners, the importance of education was again 
repeated by many informants. One cannot be socios with someone they do not share a 
level of skills and knowledge with. ”They will teach us the technology, and we will 
provide the products” envisioned Miguel, and according to a newspaper article, the 
German company K-UTEC contracted with the designing and construction of the 
lithium production plant, will also educate workforce and engineers to manage the plant 
once it starts operating.202  
With these kinds of preconditions, the ideal of resource nationalism was fitted with the 
pragmatic necessity of reliance on cooperation with corporate actors. Related to this was 
the theme of autonomy in decision making, which was common especially among 
people in the Potosí department, and was talked about both in relation to the 
government and to foreign companies. It was regarded very important that no-one 
should make decisions on behalf of those who would be affected, and that no other form 
of cooperation would be tolerated than one where Bolivians or people of Potosí get an 
equal say.  
Politics of identities became an important facet in these conversations. Identity seemed 
to be rooted in region and territory, and when talking at different scales, sometimes the 
‘other’ who was unfairly trying to take something of ‘ours’ was identified as the central 
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government in La Paz coming to rob the people in Potosí, and sometimes it was the 
transnationals coming for Bolivian goods. While this reflects the power struggles 
between the central government and departments and municipalities, it also 
demonstrates how integral natural resources are to identities, not only as commodities 
but as an important building block for autonomous entities and social connections.  
Natural resources are a “source of national dignity”203 in Bolivia, and there is a potent 
belief in the powers of them in solving economic problems and alleviating poverty – 
after all, it is the single most important sector Bolivia’s economic history is built on. 
Natural resources are very prominently on display in politics, bound profoundly with 
the idea of national sovereignty, and Kohl and Farthing argue that leftist rhetoric relies 
widely on “defending natural resources”.204 In addition to the long history of 
exploitation by others, this discourse also reflects two wars, in which Bolivia lost their 
access to the sea to Chile (in 1879-1883)205 and land in Chaco to Paraguay (in 1932-
1935). Both these wars have left scars to Bolivian sovereign identity, and explain why 
conceptualising nationalising resources as defending them is politically very 
effective.206  
This could be noticed when I asked who would benefit most of lithium production in 
Bolivia, and what kinds of impacts it could bring either Bolivia, the region of Potosí or 
more specifically Uyuni (depending on who I was talking to and where). Especially 
those with no or less academic background, and greater ties to the area of Potosí, 
became quite patriotic, and Ángel summed these sentiments with the following 
statements: “We need to protect the reserve that is going to help all Bolivians.” “All us 
Bolivians need knowledge of the theme of lithium, and we also thank God the creator 
for giving us this richness.” “There will not be any problems because all of us have one 
common vision.” These excerpts illustrate a strong idea of shared Bolivian identity, 
which was tightly linked to the natural resources. The same notion can be seen reversed 
in how the government and GNRE responded to criticism against the project; the critics 
were accused of being imperial right-wingers. The project was for the good of Bolivia, 
and anyone opposing it was unpatriotic and not thinking of the best of their country.  
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Those with background in economics had a more pessimistic view of the beneficiaries 
of the lithium project, and suspected that it would probably further European and 
Northern American interests, because that is where the current markets for sustainable 
energy and electric vehicles are. According to them, lithium will benefit those who 
develop the new technologies that use lithium, because the end products are where the 
money accumulates, not the primary material. Fernando exclaimed quite passionately at 
the end of our interview: “the lithium is not going to benefit us at all, because in what 
can I use lithium? Nothing. Many people say: but in your watch! But this watch is 
Swiss, meaning that I did not make it, the Swiss did.”  
A battery factory operating in Palca, Potosí was often mentioned as the only concrete 
example of Bolivian added value in lithium production, the phase three of the project. 
But when asked of more specifically, the role of it was always quickly dismissed. 
Although it was usually first called a factory, it became soon apparent that it only 
assembles batteries, and that none of the parts are actually made in Bolivia, but come 
from China. Marco Antonio called the factory a fraud that was only meant to make 
people think that there was value adding production going on, even though this was not 
the case. This further highlighted the role of nationalism; informants talking about the 
battery factory were aware of the importance of value adding industrialisation and the 
detriments of remaining a primary produce exporter, which the current government was 
in their view focusing too much on, but there were no other concrete projects or plans of 
this kind of activity they could refer to. 
The paradox of emphasising the importance of Bolivians doing everything while at the 
same time excluding Bolivian universities seemed to indicate that while resource 
nationalism is a complex political, economic and social phenomenon, it is also used as 
political rhetoric tool, and due to a long history of exploitation by foreign powers and 
struggle against privatising resources, it is very persuasive. Miguel commented this by 
saying that what the government talks about and what the government actually does are 
two different things. When the government uses words such as ‘protecting’ and 
‘defending’ the national natural resources, they appeal strongly to the identities of the 
people. These are also concepts that are linked with environmental protection, working 
therefore well together with an environmentally conscious image Bolivia is constructing 
on a global arena. ‘Defending’ in this instance does not, however refer to defending the 
nature from exploitation, but to defending the resources from others, outsiders, 
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exploiting them first. Thus although according to Vivir Bien there should be no 
dichotomy between human and nature, using resource nationalism as a tool to gain 
support for extractivism reduces nature to a commodity – which is exactly what Vivir 
Bien on the other hand is fundamentally against. 
3.3.3 Vivir Bien 
Although Vivir Bien and its relation to extractions was one of my initial points of 
interest, it became quickly evident in my interviews that Vivir Bien would not come up 
naturally in discussing lithium extraction and its possible benefits and impacts to 
Bolivia. This already of itself alluded to Vivir Bien not being a pervasive notion or topic 
in the everyday life in Bolivia. Only Mario brought up Vivir Bien on his own, and in the 
rest of the interviews I asked whether they were familiar with the concept and if they 
felt that it was in any way related to lithium production and/ or extractions in general. 
Responses to my question of the linkages between lithium production and Vivir Bien 
varied a lot: those who were more pro-government also saw lithium as a means to an 
end and hoped it would bring prosperity to the people of Bolivia and Potosí. These more 
optimistic interviewees rationalised that if the riches of Bolivia are utilised well, they 
can help provide a good life for all Bolivians, and therefore lithium could be used to 
promote Vivir Bien. Those who were more critical of the government saw lithium as a 
capitalist project that would primarily benefit those in power and European and North 
American interests, and therefore to them it was not at all compatible with Vivir Bien. 
When I brought up Vivir Bien with José Luis at the GNRE, his response was a stiff “I 
would rather not take part in politics.” 
There was no coherent view of what Vivir Bien is and entails, which is not surprising as 
the concept is derived from a conglomerate of indigenous cosmologies. According to 
Gudynas, “the term Buen Vivir is best understood as an umbrella for a set of different 
positions”207, or like Arze said: “Everyone has their own theory about Vivir Bien.” 
Some people described Vivir Bien through leftist rhetoric as a set of equal opportunities 
for life, and others did not relate to it at all, viewing it as something concerning only 
indigenous people. “It is ethics and a view based on indigenous ideas of living in 
harmony with the nature, an ethic value. It is a romanticised idea of the indigenous 
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people as inherently good, who are not ambitious or could not be described as 
consumers”, characterised Marco Antonio, giving the concept moral attributes as well. 
Those interviewees who understood Vivir Bien in the most practical manner also saw 
least contradiction in coupling extractivism to Vivir Bien. “We hope that these 
economic resources will be invested in our communities in basic construction, sewage 
systems, health, energy, communications, roads and all our products, like quinoa”, said 
Walter. It was also recognised by him, Mario and Ángel that lack of these basic 
functions hindered industrialisation and other development outside of cities and larger 
centres. Without proper roads, no local produce could be distributed and without 
electricity and energy no plants could be powered. 
These same active community members also argued that even if Vivir Bien and 
extractivism do have some conflicts, they are not inherent, and therefore can be 
conquered with development and technology. They felt that being in harmony with the 
nature does not necessarily require refraining from utilising any of its reserves; 
producing lithium in an environmentally sustainable way could be seen as living in 
balance with and of the nature. This was linked with the resource nationalist view of 
lithium as something that has been given to Bolivians to utilise. 
Others with views of Vivir Bien as a more ideological set of values rather than as basic 
measures of human development were less optimistic of its applicability in lithium 
production. Marco Antonio, the university professor with anti-government leanings, 
talked of how  
Vivir Bien should be about Mother Earth, about protecting her, but Mother 
Earth is being treated badly by Bolivians themselves. There is no real discourse 
for protecting the environment, only on an ideological level which looks good 
for people looking at Bolivia and the government from the outside. 
Apart from few very pro-government interviewees everyone else expressed in some 
way a view that Vivir Bien is not fulfilled. “It is only a word that is not realized”, 
lamented Ángel, even though he had expressed a rather pragmatic understanding of 
Vivir Bien. There was especially frustration expressed in the fact that the government 
has had ten years to bring about concrete development, but many felt that little change 
had happened. One researcher described Vivir Bien as a discourse that is masking a 
“capitalist form of destruction without law”. He continued explaining his view that the 
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acts of destroying the nature and building highways on indigenous lands208 are the same 
as before, but because the foreign investor is China instead of US this is disguised as 
non-capitalist. He and many other interviewees expressed the view that natural resource 
extraction will always be in contradiction to Vivir Bien, because in order to reach Vivir 
Bien one would have to change the mentality of producing things completely, and this 
had not happened. 
Another interesting way of viewing development and alternatives to development in 
Bolivia was brought up by Miguel: because Bolivia was not as developed on Western 
standards as other countries in Latin America, this could actually be very beneficial to 
them. He felt that in other countries there had been a clearer change in national identity 
towards global citizenship, and that this had led to “bad development”. Bad 
development in his view could be seen for example in how a lot of population had 
concentrated in megalopolises like Lima in Peru, and that pursuing a dream of a 
Western way of modern life only lead to growing inequality and disparity between the 
cities and the countryside. He argued that so far Bolivia had avoided the identity-
changing bad development, and therefore had more of a tabula rasa on which to start 
building a better version of development.  
The relationship between Vivir Bien and resource extractions is complex, and even 
though some of my interviewees did not perceive these to be inherently opposing, the 
lithium project as it was being actualised did not seem to conform to the ideals of Vivir 
Bien. As Gudynas attests, the key of Vivir Bien in the modern age is to conduct 
economic actions and divide revenues according to the ideals of it.209 In the current 
project decision making was centralised, the environment was not a priority in the 
development of the project, and distribution of proceeds was not yet determined. These 
findings confirm claims in existing academic literature, according to which Vivir Bien 
is yet to be realised in practice, and like Villalba asserts, the policies are actually closer 
to human development agendas than Vivir Bien.210 The fact that social welfare is tightly 
coupled with natural resource extractions means that nature is in fact an economic asset, 
not a part of the community as Vivir Bien envisions.211  
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All in all, Vivir Bien, as seen through the lithium project, resembles distinctly 
traditional development financed by state-led natural resource extractions, which does 
not set the Bolivian State as far apart from capitalism as they wish. They are, in fact, 
dependent on it. The extractions are valuable only as long as they will be consumed, and 
commoditise nature just as much as if these actions were carried out solely by private 
corporations. Within these contested relations, the functioning of resource nationalism 
becomes essential: as a rhetoric tool, it allows discourse to divert from the 
inconsistencies of the current government to nationalism and common enemies from the 
past. Ideologically and as a concept explaining strong links between identities and the 
nature, both resource nationalism and Vivir Bien arise from the same will to depart from 
Western oppression. Therefore, I argue that within this intersection resource nationalism 
has the ability to form an effective, if rickety bridge between extraction and an ideal that 
is inherently against extraction. 
I would also like to argue, that regardless of the practical successfulness of Vivir Bien it 
is a concept that has power to disassociate Bolivia of their seeming ‘underdeveloped’ 
status. According to Escobar developmentalism is harmful both when it accomplishes 
its tasks and when it does not, because it forms identities and frames the world in a way 
that is beneficial only to the Western rule212. Similarly, Vivir Bien can have the power 
of creating an encompassing cultural space from a distinctly Andean/ indigenous/ 
multicultural point of view that is relatable for Bolivians, and does not aim at the profit 
of an exogenous force. While a breach away from neoliberalism seems to be harder to 
achieve, by conducting development from their own set of values, if not in practice, 
then at least in theory, Bolivia is culturally breaking away from developmentalism no 
matter how well or badly these ideologies translate to action. 
4 Conclusions and Further Implications 
4.1 Linking Lithium Production, Extractivism and Vivir Bien 
This thesis has examined the contested relations between resource extractivism and 
Vivir Bien as an alternative to development through the case of lithium development in 
Bolivia. The theoretical foundation for the analysis is based on post-development 
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critique, extractivism and political ecology of the subsoil, and the two central concepts 
through which I have aimed to explain the linkages and dissonances visible in my 
empirical findings are neo-extractivism and resource nationalism, the latter of which I 
have also connected to conflicts that emerge from the struggles between decentralisation 
and a strong state. 
Extractivism has undeniably accelerated during the Morales government, and even 
though it is justified with the framework of neo-extractivism, there is a stated 
understanding that in order to develop a more sustainable economic system, Bolivia 
needs to move beyond exporting primary materials. At the same time, it is eminent that 
a switch away from hydrocarbon-based energy and transportation in the world is 
required, to which lithium could provide a solution. Lithium could be the material of the 
future and very prosperous for Bolivia, and there has been a lot of hyperbole 
surrounding the potential of lithium, especially in relation to Bolivia due to their large 
reserves.213 But so far lithium is not yet produced on an industrial scale in Bolivia, and it 
will not happen in a good while either. The slow pace of the project has subdued 
enthusiasm and there appear to be many kinds of difficulties and inconsistencies within 
the project that can be linked to conflicts of extractivism. 
Extractivism is an integral part of Latin American political economies214, and to 
understand current dissonances within Bolivian neo-extractivism and the progress of 
lithium production, it is crucial to examine it within the historical framework of Latin 
America. Centuries of pillage both by colonisers and foreign and transnational 
companies have shaped Bolivian identities, and this is heightened within indigenous 
groups especially when coupled with concepts such as Vivir Bien, which do not make a 
dichotomous division between human and nature. The burden of plunder is particularly 
felt in Potosí, one of Bolivia’s poorest departments that has seen its mineable riches 
disappear overseas. In this light it is no wonder that lithium production by foreign 
companies was originally rejected vehemently, which led to the situation that Bolivia 
hosts the world’s largest known reserves of lithium, the worth of which has multiplied 
manifold after their initial discovery, but which are yet to be industrially exploited. 
The presidency of Evo Morales marked a new leaf in Bolivian politics, and a process of 
democratisation and decentralisation along with popular uprisings in the gas and water 
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wars paved way for the victory of MAS. In the 90s Bolivia was one of the countries 
where IFI dictated structural adjustments were implemented most profoundly, and since 
then politics have taken a sharp turn to the left, towards post-neoliberal economics. 
Morales’s governments have also brought indigenous concepts into state politics, and 
while Vivir Bien should not be reduced to political rhetoric, the notion does function in 
that capacity as well. There is a clear will in Bolivia to depart from Western ideals and 
the neoliberal era, and Vivir Bien offers a concrete alternative to development.  
Within this new political atmosphere lithium production has been much better received 
in Potosí, but the empirical findings of this research show that frictions between the 
central government and department and community autonomies have risen due to the 
State’s declaration of the lithium reserve as a strategic resource, a tactic for increasing 
the state’s role and importance in an age of decentralisation. This has led to conflicts 
with the interests of Potosí people and the State’s plans, and power imbalances that 
could prove volatile especially if environmental or other problems should arise. 
Problems of previous governments, such as clientelism and corruption are not history, 
either, and social ties play a great part in assigning people to different state posts. These 
issues were reflected in criticism over poor management of the project. Also, the 
government’s will to reassert their power has led to practices and approaches that 
appear illogical and incongruous. A critical condition of the lithium project was that it 
must be developed with Bolivian money and the benefits must come first and foremost 
to Bolivians, yet GNRE is not collaborating with Bolivian universities, opting for 
contracting foreign companies instead, and undisclosed particulars of technical 
processes and contracts have led to environmental concerns. The government seems to 
rely on nationalist rhetoric, but does not include other parts of the society, such as the 
academic community, within its version of ‘nationalism’. 
In addition to the conflict between reasserting state power after years of 
decentralisation, these dissonances have ties to neo-extractivism and point to the 
inherent contradictions of the political practice. Ills that extractivism cause to the 
environment and to local communities are not erased with a neo-extractivist approach, 
and even the fulfilment of the most important distinction from traditional extractivism, 
emphasis on social spending, was challenged in my findings, in accordance to Webber’s 
critique215. The issues of extractivism might not be as strongly present in lithium 
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evaporitics as they are for example in conventional mining and hydrocarbon extractions, 
as so far the scope and reach of environmental effects are less known, but evidence from 
the Chilean Salar de Atacama is not promising, and decision making and distribution of 
revenues were active sources of dispute. 
It is generally agreed that Bolivia should try to move towards producing infrastructure 
and productivity generating jobs216, but it is difficult to make changes to structures that 
have been at place for decades for the sole purpose of export-led economics. When it 
comes to explaining the contested relationship of extractivism and Vivir Bien, this 
research conforms to the claims in existing academic literature that Vivir Bien is not 
actualised in practice. In this conjuncture, resource nationalism emerges as a crucial 
concept explaining the findings. Formerly colonised South American countries view 
nationalising their natural resources as a way of taking back power that first colonisers, 
then foreign and multinational companies have had over their assets. Natural resources 
have strong ties to identities, and in Bolivia they form an important building block of 
national patrimony. In the empiric material this can be seen in the conflicts between the 
centralised state and the local levels of decision making, and in the nationalist outbursts 
that appeared in discussions of how lithium would benefit Bolivia. I therefore argue that 
resource nationalism operates both as a rhetoric tool for justifying extractivism and as a 
tie between extractivism and Vivir Bien, as it stems from the same will to depart from 
Western oppression as Vivir Bien itself. 
To conclude, at the centre of the research and analysis are dissonances within Bolivian 
politics and practices. The most notable findings of the thesis are its contributions to the 
academic conversation surrounding Vivir Bien, neo-extractivism, and its central 
argument that resource nationalism can be understood as a bridging tool between 
resource extractivism and Vivir Bien. The latter also points towards the value of using 
political ecology in the study of subsoil resource extractions, an arena that is 
traditionally approached through political economy and resource governance.  
4.2 Final Remarks 
The problems surrounding the relationship between resource extractions, export-led 
growth and welfare building are manifold, and further framed by the underlying global 
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power structures. At the nation level these issues are economic, structural, 
environmental, and cultural, and in Bolivia they are to a great extent the result of a 
history of extractivist economics. This means that the structures in place that favour 
export-led, extractivist economics and politics are difficult to dismantle or even revise, 
in addition to which nationalising resources has powerful connotations regarding 
Bolivians sense of sovereignty and pride. It seems difficult to forgo this economic path 
that Bolivia is on, but revising it in relation to its environmental effects and ensuring 
that local communities are heard and taken into account as well as sufficiently 
compensated for losses, while gradually lessening the dependency on raw material 
exports would be advisable in mitigating the adverse effects and risks while trying to 
build economic growth with which to develop welfare and equity. 
With regard to lithium, it remains to be seen what the balance between potential ills and 
advantages will be to Bolivia and more specifically Potosí and Salar de Uyuni and its 
surrounding communities. After all this boils down to the question: can a poor state that 
lacks infrastructure and has a very volatile political history utilise its natural resources 
in a way that truly benefits the state, yet is sustainable at the same time? Lithium with 
its connections to clean tech and promises of reducing global dependency on 
hydrocarbons sounds promising and certainly carries potential, but on the other hand, it 
requires very high technical expertise and strategic economic planning that might just 
not be viable for Bolivia in the current juncture. 
The tones of my interviews ranged from utopia-level optimism to “nothing will ever 
change and each government is worse than the last one”-depths of despair, often within 
one interview. This describes the project well: on one hand, everyone recognises the 
potential of lithium; optimally, lithium could help free the world of a dependency of 
hydrocarbons, producing it is not (allegedly) intrinsically harmful to the nature, and if 
industrialisation is coupled with education, it could foster technological growth in 
Bolivia. Revenues from lithium could be allocated to social development. On the other 
hand, in reality so far the project had been advancing on slow motion, environmental 
concerns were responded to tersely and local communities had no say in matters relating 
to them.   
The world needs to advance to alternative energy sources, but it is not easy. At the same 
time, it is apparent that countries like Bolivia should advance from being mere primary 
material producers, but that is not easy either. The current global power structures are 
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severely tilted to the benefit of the industrialised countries. Although Vivir Bien 
presents an ideological departure from Western practices, Bolivia must exist in a global 
arena, where the dilemmas of extractivism are interlinked with centuries of 
dependencies, value chains benefitting the industrialised countries and the powerful 
cultural hegemony of modernity. As long as there is demand for natural resources in the 
West, there will be extractivism.217  
Therefore, a restructuring of economy in the North seems to be a prerequisite for the 
South to become something more than a producer of primary materials. This in a way 
boils down to the paradox of modernity and its claim of rationality, which Watts and 
Peet crystallize well: “[it]is displayed in society’s demonstrated ability to destroy its 
natural conditions of existence”218. They argue that this dissonance should be 
approached in the following manner:  
the response to unreason has to be a different kind of reasoning, to guide a 
different social order of practice on nature, with a knowledge of natural 
processes, and the effects of human activity on them, consciously integrated into 
the very relations that make up society.219 
Lithium has potential in this regard, and if technological innovations were coupled with 
structural change, then maybe a departure from constant growth and unsustainable 
development could just be attainable globally. The social and political linkages of 
technology present a very interesting avenue for further research as well, and studying 
the relations between post-development alternatives and products of modernity, such as 
technology, that this thesis has brushed on, could provide interesting insights in this 
arena. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Map of Bolivia 
Source: United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Cartographic Section. 
Map No. 3875 Rev.3, August 2004. Available at 
<<www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/bolivia.pdf>>, accessed 3.5.2017. 
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Appendix 2: Map of Salar de Uyuni and surrounding areas 
 
Map from Google Maps, additional markings by author. 
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Appendix 3: Pictures of Salar de Uyuni 
Salar de Uyuni during rainy season. Picture from Sudamericahoy.com 
<<sudamericahoy.com/turismo/salar-de-uyuni-caminar-en-un-desierto-de-bolivia/>> 
Accessed 25.4.2017. 
Salar de Uyuni during dry season. Picture from GNRE Memoria 2013. 
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Appendix 4: Traditional evaporation pool method 
 
 
The lithium-potash brine production via solar evaporation.  
Focus on Quality Lithium Brine Explorers, prepared by Genuity, in Espí Rodriguez and 
Sanz Contreras 2013: 5. 
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Appendix 5: Evaporation pools in Salar de Uyuni 
 
Evaporation pools in Salar de Uyuni. Picture from GNRE Memoria 2013. 
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Appendix 6: List of interviews 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Name Description Date 
Carlos Arze 
Vargas Researcher at CEDLA 30.11.2015 
“José Luis” Engineer at GNRE 1.12.2015 
“Miguel” Economist and docent in a Bolivian University 
3.12.2015 and 
4.1.2016 
Ricardo Calla 
Former minister of Indigenous Affairs and 
independent researcher in environmental 
politics and economics 
4.12.2015 
“Mario” Active member of his community in the municipality of Colcha K 9.12.2015 
“Walter” Veteran activist in his community in the municipality of Colcha K 9.12.2015 
“Fernando” Active member of his community in the municipality of Uyuni 10.12.2015 
“David” Researcher who had been involved in the early stages of lithium discussions in Bolivia 
15.12.2016, 
16.12.2016 and 
17.12.2016 
“Marco 
Antonio” University professor 16.12.2016 
“Ángel” A member of COMCIPO 21.12.2016 
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Appendix 7: Interview guide and questions (translated in English) 
Interview guide 
1) Background 
2) General conceptions 
3) Pros 
4) Cons 
5) Power 
6) Future 
7) Vivir Bien 
 
Interview questions 
Background 
1. What is your role regarding lithium development/ production? 
2. How did you end up/ get in the position you are at now? / How did you become 
the (what the person is)? 
3. What drives you in what you do? 
4. What motivates you in your job/ activism? 
5. What are your concrete tasks? 
General Conceptions 
6. What are your own experiences of lithium production? 
7. Do you think lithium will bring prosperity to your area? 
8. Or more widely in Bolivia? 
Pros 
9. What kinds of advantages does lithium production bring to your area? 
10. How about to Bolivia more widely? 
11. Who do you think will benefit most from lithium production? 
Cons 
12. Do you think there are problems linked with lithium production? 
13. What kinds of problems? 
14. What do you think should be done about these issues? 
Power 
15. Have you been heard in decision making? 
16. Who gets to take part in decision making? 
17. Who makes final calls? 
18. What do you think has changed between the current government and the last 
one? 
Future 
19. How do you see the future of your area? 
20. Do you think lithium production has an impact to the future of your area? 
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21. How do you see the future of lithium? 
22. How do you see the future of Bolivia? 
Vivir Bien 
23. The government has used the term Vivir Bien in its development plans, are you 
familiar with the term? 
24. Does the term Vivir Bien mean something to you? 
25. What do you think is good life? 
26. Do you think Vivir Bien is related to lithium production in some way? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
